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Pragmatics of Environmental Conflict Resolution for Sustained Peace

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Introduction

Environmental conflicts, their causes and methods to resolve such crises for sustained peace are widely discussed in our times. A number of National and International bodies, programmes, and projects deal with these issues with urgency and vigor, important among them are the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)[1], the United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive action or the Framework Team (FT)[2], Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP)[3] and Centre for Peace and Development Studies, India (CPDSINDIA)[4].

Environmental conflict is not another practical problem. It is rather, an acute problem acceding to me because it is *value-loaded* practical problem on three counts: first, when properly analyzed for nature, causes and nature of causes, it points out ethical poverty in governance, policy making, administration and management. Second, environmental conflict raises deep and serious issues of ethical right, and just. Third, conflict resolution method(s) demand ethical justification than mere technical justification. It is therefore important to focus on the 'acute' feature of environmental conflict and suggest a model of resolution that is technically and ethically justifiable. Further, it is important to show how ethical poverty in democratic governance ought to be addressed to. The focus on democratic governance is not because value-loaded problem like environmental conflict is cared for in democracyalone rather, the critique of methods of value-resolution considered here and the model proposed subsequently concerns democratic way of life. However, critique of models of environmental conflict resolution should be preceded by analysis of the problem in consideration.

Environmental Conflict

Importantly, environmental conflict for its proper analysis is inextricably bound to ecological conflict because we need to stress on the complex interrelations with

ecosystem and its capacity for self-regulation along with hard facts of environmental change, mostly human made having distinct destabilizing impact in the dynamic ecosystem's equilibrium. Once remarkable impacts are noticed, the ecosystem is forced upon to find a changed level of equilibrium and for which it has to change the supporting conditions it offers for human living. Nevertheless, for simplicity and other practical purposes we can carry on the environmental conflict talk. This talk is often dominated (and unnecessarily so) by a single variateanalysis of scarcity of natural resources, their depletion and degradation[5]. Whereas, a careful multivariate analysis reveals nature of conflicts, their causes and reasons for such conflict more cogently. The traditional over simplistic scarcity based analysis is often followed by a blatant confusion between depletion and degradation of resources and environmental conflicts. We are keeping in mind violent conflicts in human societies in the main. However, nagging non-violent conflicts are no less urgent a problem. Finally, proper analysis of environmental conflict should take note of degradation of renewableresourcesthan depletion because we generally refer to non-renewable resource depletion. We deplete iron ore reserve while extracting it for a period but when we start using the ore to manufacture steel, we start degrading air, water, soil etc. in our environment to reach a state disagreeable in our life space. Degradation of environment is thus a negative talk, factually and ethically, a human judgment of nature's state that is disagreeable. Renewable resources are used and may be over used yet may be put in the feedback chain system in nature, which is not the case with non-renewable resources. Hence, trees available to us may be used for a number of purposes and put into a feedback chain system as well; so far that happens, our judgment is not an adverse one and so far that does not happen, we speak of degradation of environmental resource or simply, we degrade nature by virtue of our use and overuse.

However, we find that natural resource depletion and degradation are both detrimental to nature on the whole. The UNEP report ratifies that though natural resource degradation from the human valuation perspective is crucial, depletion of resources count dearly. This is evident in the resource depletion conflict report since 1990 that tells us about eighteen violent conflicts across the globe (Mathew& Jensen, 2009: 8).

It is a little trite to say that conflicts pertaining to environment are environmental conflicts. Better to say that conflicts of environmental origin are environmental conflicts or conflicts that originate owing to renewable resource degradation are environmental conflicts (Libiszewski, 1992: 6). It is widely agreed that non-renewable resource degradation takes place due to geopolitical and socioeconomic scarcities and *renewable resource depletion* is due to physical scarcities. Different from the renewable resource depletion, environmental degradation is then due to human use and overuse of renewable resources but utter failure in subsequent resource management or sustainable

management. Overuse of and failure to manage these resources is not a human folly embedded in nature of humans, it is in the main ethical failure or *ethical weakness* (weakness of will). We may conclude that environmental conflicts have environmental origin or origin in resource management, whereas other conflicts are political, geopolitical and socioeconomic in nature originating in resource distribution. Resource distribution failure and management failure are crucial to our living space. An excellent account of history of conflicts of both origins in India that has attracted attention may be found in the works of Madhav Gadgil and Ramchandra Guha (1994& 1992) and RamchandraGuha (2014).

(Acute) Environmental Problems and Critique of Models of Sustained Peace

Environmental conflicts (taken as degradation of renewable resources and failure in resource management) are acute in nature. The crucial reason (or cause) for environmental conflict, therefore, could be identified in human follies of overuse and failure in resource management. Such follies do not find proper explanation without referring to our *moral failure* to restrain overuse of natural resources not for mere need fulfillment but greed for being well-off causing social and political impacts, such as, migration, refugees, unstable government, and social unrest. Conflicts percolate to group based, racial, cultural and inter and intrastate disharmony awaiting resolution for sustained peace. Poor governance is often a result and at times causes such conflicts.

The value-loaded feature of environmental conflicts is created by weakness of human will to have failed in judicious use of renewable resources and failure to manage these resources that include sustainable steps to put back the resources in its feedback system and appropriate management of nature's sink capacity (pollution). Furthermore, such conflicts point towards serious questions of right, good and just in the role of democratic governance to safeguard our living space. Now, governance is not another party phenomenon, it isourparticipatoryenterpriseparticularly in democracy, to formulate policies, rules and laws to enforce and safeguard them. Hence, it is a human moral folly altogether to have failed to participate in the needed democratic process. Interestingly, decision-making and policy formulation in democracies ought to be ethically anchored. This is basic presupposition of pragmatic or practical ethics. It is important therefore to elaborate on pragmatic ethical mechanic that underpins public participation in resolving environmental crises acute in nature and assure peace.

It is clear that models of conflict resolution succeed if they are careful about value-loaded practical problems that these conflicts are. Some schematic presentations at this place clarify how best we can understand environmental conflict in terms of their nature and causes (reasons) and how weak or poor democratic governance is responsible

in human failure to have not only contributed to the quantum of the problem, rather failure in resolution of value-crises that are extremely disturbing in our times.

A.　Synoptic Presentation of The Toronto Group Model (Homer-Dixon, 1994: 5-40)

The Model is based on the following presuppositions:

(I)　Land Degradation->>　Violent Conflicts;

(ii)　Deforestation->>　　　Violent Conflicts;

(iii)　Low Fresh Water availability->>　　　Violent Conflicts;

(I) - (iii) are supply induced conflicts. Further,

(iv)　High population density->>　Violent conflicts (Demand Induced) and

(v)　High income inequality->>　Violent conflicts (structural)

B.　Synoptic Presentation of Revision made by Gleditsch and Sverdrup(2002: 45-70)

Gleditsch and Sverdrup have noted the following defects of the Toronto model:

(I)　It does not consider variation in the dependent variables like actual factors for environmental degradation and focuses on scarcity factors;

(ii)　the land distribution factor has not been considered;

(iii)　some other important factors such as low GNP, high external debt, primary commodity export, low industrialization have been overlooked;

(iv)　most importantly, *poor democratic institutions and governance* thatcontributes to encouragement and escalation of violence have not been adequately stressed.

Gleditsch – Sverdrup based their model on the revised theoretical presuppositions as below:

(i)　In order to understand the reasons for environmental conflicts properly in democracies, evaluation of effects of democracy is of great importance. The negative effects are less emission of climate gases whereas the positive effects are deforestation and loss of biodiversity (also erosion).

(ii)　However, even democracies have though positive effects on conflict; they are less violent (or even non-violent).

(iii) Despite that, in developing countries since 1980s, incidence of armed/ violent conflicts have increased owing to several economic stresses as well as population boom and unstable governance. Hence, all these factors relating to democratic governance have to be noted for revision of H-D model.

C.   Synoptic Presentation of Revised model of Hauge and Ellingsen(1998: 299-317)

Taking a cue from Gleditsch and Sverdrup features related to democratic governance and correlative escalation of armed conflicts at times a war-like situation have been noted:

(i)   Democratic countries (only stable ones) ->> Less armed conflicts

(ii)   High level economic development ->> Less armed conflicts

(iii) Other than H-Dvariants, thosementioned in the previous revisions better explain armed/ violent conflicts due to environmental degradation.

The synoptic presentation of the H-D model mentioned above points out the parameters based on which further revisions have been made. These revisions clarify that the onus of environmental conflicts rest on failure of democratic governance though violence escalation, non-violent protest based conflicts and attempt at their resolution are noticeable in democracies.

Raison d'êtreì of environmental conflicts leading to war-like situation

The moot point is whether or not the schemas have anything to say about *what* is weakness of governments and how can we get rid of it. I do not think skimping at this point is desirable either. I will further continue with the what question to clarify the value-loaded feature of unstable government and poor governance. These models have provided threadbare causal analysis of the problem and obliquely suggested stable democracy, high level of economic development, increase in economic productivity, population control and a number of internal and external stress factors. However, the models miss the point that "stable" government (in democracies or elsewhere) is the one that need not merely work on the ethos: 'at least non-violent conflicts are better' or 'at least conflict de-escalation is better', and that acting-at-a-distance, in governance and value-resolution is unethical. Acting-at-a-distance is raison-d'être of poor leadership and governance and thus poor policy-making. Christopher Hodgkinson (1996) points out that democratic leadership and for that matter administration as leadership of organization, if forges link with power, Charisma and followership is basic to ethical

poverty. Simply stated, patriarchal governance is the main reason for failure in our democracies to resolve value-loaded environmental problems, which is in fact, governance at-a-distance.

We may proceed to consider the *how* question of value-resolution for sustained peace though it is complex and difficult to deal with. Before, proposing a model of value-resolution, I will remark briefly on the views of Johan Galtung (2007) and Peter H. Karen Jr. (1994). Galtung's position about "peace" is worth mentioning because he conceives of peace as a '*relation* between parties and notsecurity from fear of violence' (2007: 14). He further says that in conflict parties are antagonistically related, and such a relation has to be completely transformed by virtue of people transcending beyond their own cherished ideals (2007: 14). For this he speaks of deep dialogue (2007: 14) than mediation to find a 'new reality' of peaceful relation (2007: 14). In case of resolution of the value-loaded practical problem of environmental conflict, 'deep dialogue' is ethically anchored dialogue on practical issue. In such dialogues, diverse value perceptions transverse and transcend through peoples' participation in a pro-active democracy. This observation is critical for pragmatic value-resolution.

Peter H. Kahn Jr. in his paper discusses how can and indeed¸ how should environmental disputes be resolved (1994: 21). He says that both litigation and mediation do not meet the requirement here as 'how should' resolution take place is not replied humanely. However, both litigation and mediation are not interesting options. Kahn is of the opinion that 'we need to articulate commonalities in individuals' environmental views and values' (1994: 216) for 'achieving a shared vision on at least some substantive dimensions' (1994: 216) and 'to find common moral grounds across diverse cultures' (1994: 216). However, Kahn is at pains later on to find a theme between mediation and litigation replacing these with courting ethical community, in which, to court is to persuade all people! Tragically, variation in value perception is a cultural phenomenon, conflicts are equally so but value convergence and conflict resolution does not come through *persuasive tactics* but through moral dialogues and corroboration of moral views. To these we now turn to find out what ethically justifiable model of environmental conflict resolution should be like.

The Pragmatic Model for Sustained Peace

The models of environmental conflict resolution have their own merit, particularly in pointing towards weak governance causing levels of conflict, namely, high, medium and low intensity conflicts across the globe. For instance, drawing information from EJ Atlas we could gather the levels of conflicts in India since economic liberalization in 1991. Violent conflict (of high intensity) made up 46% of the conflict occurrences (283 reposted cases)[6]. An important feature of such conflicts in India is that GDP and GNP

growths post-liberalization and globalization are not violence de-escalating factors because governance and other internal and external factors causing violence persists. Ethical weakness is also noticeable when national leaders come to decide on contentious and also 'acute' environmental issue of desirable role of nations in harnessing carbon emission, notwithstanding, aspirations for growth. Decision-making and policy formulation for environmental safeguard, well-being and conflict resolution are more often than not morally weak, politically myopic and environmentally hibernated at the international forums. One such glaring case is the steady failure of COP year after year though lobbying and manipulating to corner third world countries (including developing countries) are points of success and glorification of powerful countries. Interestingly, we have the UN for environmental well-being and conflict resolution for sustained peace we shall come to it shortly. For the present, there is a need for outlining the method of conflict resolution which takes head on the crucial lacunae of weak (unethical) governance.

The pragmatic or practical turn in conflict resolution enjoys a good future if the enterprise is proactive and sustained because its driving ethos is: in-and-with-people for the desirable goal of sustained peace. This is not a prophecy rather a reasoned claim which needs more clarification.

Nature and Justification of the Pragmatic method

The pragmatic method is an ethical method of value-resolution, that is, a method to resolve value-loaded practical problems, which is taken here as 'acute' problems of violent and non-violent environmental conflicts and unrests all over the world. Pragmatic method envisions value-based decision-making and policy formulation and implementation when it comes to (a) ecological/environmental well-being and (b) human and social well-being. Ethical pragmatics strives for right and good of policies for environmental and social well-being. However, this is jeopardised due to several factors including weak governance causing environmental conflicts (ecological conflicts notwithstanding). Hence, its desirable goal is conflict resolution and sustained local and global peace by virtue of ethically good policies and governance. Pragmatic method bridges the chasm of ethics and policy-making and thus bridges the gap among 'environmental theorists, policy analysts, activists and the public' (Light &Vatz, 2007:7). We may simplify it to say that in pragmatic environmental method of value-resolution, ethical dynamics or mechanics of 'experts' occurs in-and-with 'concerned people' and therefore experts act in unison not isolation or does not act-at-a-distance. Mechanics of duty at-a-distance is patriarchal, which pragmatists deny. Value resolution and policy formulation are hand in hand with public involvement.

The vision is vindicated if the expert on duty is able to involve people in the mechanics and for that to decipher and understand meaning of moral perceptions of concerned people on conflicting issues. However, understanding moral perceptions of people is not possible without factual or empirical enrichment. Factual enrichment starts with prior information gathered by the expert or what may be called prejudices though for wider and deeper enrichment the expert has to be in-and-with the environment – the locale, people and culture. The experts on ground level of reality are enriched about ecological/environmental factors and causes (reasons) of conflicts to the nature and quantum of the problems, the parties concerned with the problems and about the troubleshooters. In fact, moral perceptions of people are inextricably bound to factuality. Hence, bereft of empirical enrichment, moral enrichment is a far-cry. It is also important to note that empirical and moral enrichment is in a given socio-historicity or a flux of socio-political-economic-cultural factors. Moral and empirical enrichments are in a given socio-historicity and therefore, fluid or moving neither static nor final. Hence, depiction or understanding of moral perceptions of people happens in flux of socio-historicity and events, and thus never absolute or final.

Moral enrichment is arduous because it depends on an important but challenging *research* - the phenomenological –hermeneutic or hermeneutic-phenomenological research (HPR). If we count on both, the empirical and the HPR for moral enrichment, they are rolled into what may be called a social-scientific vocation wherein the chasm of what things are and what value-system of people are go hand in hand for the most important thing, that is, conflict resolution and subsequent peace. Environmental pragmatics involves mechanics of duty on the part of the expert to be involved in unique social-scientific vocation. This is the basic presupposition for having value-based policy formulations for both environmental good and peace in human societies. Now the point is how HPR is justified in the entire scheme of things.

Justification of HPR in environmental pragmatics

Environmental pragmatics demand experts concerned about conflict resolution and value-based policy formulation to understand the lived experiences of people who bear the brunt of environmental conflicts and want solution and peace. Understanding the lived experiences of concerned people (or parties in value resolution) demands hermeneutical method and to understand the meaning or essence of such experiences presuppose phenomenological method. Hence, HPR as an important aspect of conflict resolution by the expert is justified for enriching the moral vocabulary of the expert. The expert comes to know what concerned parties think to be right, good and just about environmental well-being and implemented in reality and what policies need to be

formulated. HPR is thus primitive to policy-making and implementation as well as basic to conflict resolution in communion.

The argument form lived experiences of people assume that though common men or parties in conflict enjoy moral authority to value-resolution and they are able to do so, they may not be empowered in such mechanics of social duty and even fail under peer pressure of experts or other people, do not open up for fear, shame and anger. The primary task of the expert (who is also a researcher) is to enable people to actively participate in sharing their moral perceptions and thus enriching the moral vocabulary of the expert. For the expert it is extremely important 'to analyze the ethical thinking visible'. (Lindseth&Norberg, 2004: 145). In order to visualize people's moral thinking, attempt is to interpret the least available, not a body of written document but moral intuitions and moral experiences of man. This is available to the expert in social scientific vocation through interviews, discussions, story-telling, and talking to people. Hermeneutical understanding of text is a movement from the talked about to what it talks about, that is, phenomenal talks to understanding essence or meaning of talks. It is of extreme importance for the expert of pragmatic mechanics to have access to a body of expressions or narratives from lived experiences. Hence, pragmatic level mechanics of duty is preceded by pre-pragmatic mechanics of duty underpinned in empirical enrichment and HPR.

Another justification of HPR comes from Heidegger Hermeneutic Phenomenology (HHR). For Heidegger, a deeper understanding of the meaning of being a person is understanding the meaning of being as ethics and it is important than knowing the being as pure existence. Heidegger speaks of the value of care for person's experience, that is, to interpret the different ways in which the person exists in the world to realize the idea of existence as ethics. In order to have existential experiences, the expert should care for the ethical perceptions of other for conflict resolution and policy formulations. Another important point is that Heidegger encourages experts to interpret and understand ethical views of people intersubjectively in a given context because moral understanding comes from subjectively shared meanings – 'understanding is a mode of ordinary practical experiences. We understand in and through the experience of being involved with concerned people and events.' (Kerdeman, 1998:249).

Having justified HPR in experts' scheme of things it is important to underline some of its limits when we consider the *next level* mechanics of duty or the *pragmatic level*. Pre-pragmatic empirical and moral enrichments are basic to the family of experts at decision-making, policy formulation and policy implementation work that relates to both environmental good and social goods (among other things) value-resolution and peace-building. The expert level discourses are more technical but fortified with empirical and moral enrichments, the discourses are value-based, humane, and rational.

It is also politically correct in being empathetic to nature and man (in-and-with-them) the result is encouraging in the form of ethical governance. In fact, further dialogue is needed not for expert family's intellectual superiority but for the obvious limit of pre-pragmatic enrichments that in socio-historic flux, value perceptions are never absolute of final, it is not complete because complete comprehensions of moral perceptions of other is not possible. Once the limits of pragmatic level discourse has been accepted, there is a need to shape things in precise form of model for conflict resolution and peace building both -*inter* and *intra* communal. Nevertheless, there are problems with both and there is a need to understand these problems for outlining a relatively sound model of environmental conflict management and peace.

The moot problem is whether or not moral deliberation in democratic climate for value-resolution is realistic? Does democratic moral deliberation lead to intersubjective corroboration for environmental decision-making and policy work? Even if it is less problematic as it appears to be at the inter-communal conflict scenario, is it realistic at the intra-communal level? There are views which suggest that such deliberations are futile in conflict resolution because even in ideal democracies intersubjective corroboration is only unrealizable utopia. It really does not succeed because at inter and intra communal discourse on contentious issues it is difficult to organize all parties who can make relevant contribution in moral corroboration and decision-making. It is difficult to moderate moral discourse leading to consensus for variations in factual/scientific as well as ethical perceptions of these parties. Most importantly, in given socio-economic, political and cultural variations for parties in discourse does not easily come to concede their positions may be due to peer pressure or supremacy or egotism or just because they are perennially under the spell of anthropocentrism or non-anthropocentrism. In fact, in democratic scenario, it looks really implausible that parties would agree on delicate issues and even if agreement on certain points is reached that may not change their preferences because attitudinal and behavioral changes are not correlative. Another serious limit to deliberative consensus is that within a country there may be politically proactive groups who would simply not participate in the mainstream dialogue because they have no faith on democratic decision-making that enables significant change in social and political structure. These groups may be active in-and-with people and are empirically and morally enriched on environmental issues of deep trouble, yet they have no faith in the said soft power of dialogue, agreement and sustained peace. They believe that the democratic set-up is corrosive and major reason for conflict because it is by and for handful bourgeoisie. Whatever degree of misconception is built in these charges, particularly the last one (of limit), faithful as Norton and Habermas are about value of democratic deliberation still need not agree on other aspects in deliberation.

Habermas for instance, does not ask only for more and more wide deliberation because such deliberations may be of some use at the inter-communal level, though not effective in intra-communal consensus about conflict management. Norton's conception of giving certain incentives to people at inter-communal disagreement to impact on their otherwise staunch attitude may be effective but the problem is whether it is effective intra-communally on contentious issues? This brings us to realize the problems that Norton faces in deliberative environmental conflict resolution. His conception of inter-communal deliberation may not be extrapolated intra-communally. Habermas is of the opinion that intra-communal discourses are conducted among "experts" in complex situations, that is, the agglomeration of experts having their varied prejudices, enrichments and also goals, needs and operations come to deliberate on issues impacting international community to participate in value resolution for a hypothetical greater good. However, this is successful if and only if the respective ethnocentricity has been left aside to value for a wider deliberative agglomeration that cares for rational consensus and allows sound arguments to succeed. It is this utopia which is difficult to accept because (much like Rawlsian veil of ignorance) ethnocentric or inter-communal deliberative decision on moral grounds is difficult to hide under a veil. In fact, this may be extremely detrimental for the expert to do so in wider intra-communal communication. It may be undesirable as well. Hence, Norton's inter-communal deliberation need not be extrapolated. In such a situation, thinks Habermas, we may either prefer strategic negotiations or ethical discourses (Habermas, 1998) In the former case, democratic compromise between experts having varying principles and goals is the key factor, whereas in the latter case ethical scanning of right and good of decision and policies within a community is of greater importance. However, despite giving value to both under legal discourse, Habermas thinks that at the intra-communal level, to avoid stalemet, we need to stress on strategic negotiations (and bargaining).

Clearly, Norton would not prefer the liberal democratic model of strategic negotiation and correlative legal discourse because he prefers looking at environmental good and right in the inter-communal perspective like a 'mountain' or better like a 'planet'. Habermas does not agree to such constricted deliberative view because keeping aside wider strategic negotiations in intra-communal scenario is keeping aside a particular form of communal communication or deliberation itself.

However, the troubling issues for Habermas are that in reality there are situations among international experts on ethical grounds. If ethical disagreement is noticed clearly at the pragmatic level of decision-making inter-communally, the same is noticeable at the intra-communal setting among experts because in order to resolve questions of right and good experts across cultures do initiate and involve in ethical inquiries. Hence, disagreements on normative grounds surface as prominently as it is in the case of inter-

communal discourse. Habermas thinks that we need to aspire for equal coexistence in such cases that has enough space for reasonable disagreement among experts (Habermas, 1998). This requires on the one hand equal authority of experts to communicate their ethical perceptions in open dialogues that do not hinder a party to communicate on the face value of rational weakness. It also requires reasonable disagreement and allowance of corroboration when that is free from peer pressure and reasonably good. The problem is whether Habermas has landed in Norton's utopia or has accepted that this inter-communal discourse probably leads to consensus on acute issues but fails intra-communally! At this juncture we may reflect on what has failed is internationally in the COP meetings? Is it irresolvable? UN for sure is active with its different organs in resolving value crises and genuinely worried in cases of stiff stalemate. But does it succeed when governance and governments are morally weak, politically myopic and environmentally hibernated? How to overcome peer pressure and arm-twisting in the intra-communal setting? Or, do we imagine that ultras are right – there is no soft power to resolve acute crises, it needs radical structural changes through political overhaul.

Conclusion

Skepticism might do a lot of service than disservice because inter and intra-communal value-resolution for peace is a complex and arduous affair, and one is helped by raising questions, replies to which might show way out of the impasse. The problem with the ultras is that their radical structural changes would still need thousand flowers to blossom, that is, people's participation in a cultural revolution is not ruled out. Inter-communal and intra-communal dialogues tending to ethical corroboration for policy-making may still be needed by them at their utopian egalitarian state. In such state environmental acute problems would not vanish altogether - they will ever pop-up and have to be solved within the state and with the international community lest they have least faith on the international set-ups such as UN, COP, and other bodies to thrash out issues causing intra-communal disharmony - strangely minimal democracy is at work! The problem of limit to democratic discourse does not dissolve the possibility of success of discourse in value-resolution. In fact, like any pragmatic enterprise, limit is built in the entire process. We do not dream about utopian state of peace. We have argued why this is reality and we need not conceive mechanics of duty to fail in that limit.

Further, we have to accept the handicap of patriarchy in democracy because closing eyes to it will never dissolve it. Patriarchy in constitutional framework that has been constructed by social engineers (or experts) is the main reason for weakness in governance and government in a so-called democracy. The ethos of acting-at-a-distance, putting people at the fringes and intellectual chauvinism of experts (peer groups) are the reasons of unethical governance causing environmentally damaging decisions,

policies, enactment of policies and posterior reconstruction of environment. However, the bright point is that the methodological push to act-in-and with people, to declass from patriarchy and ethical chauvinism, and to place HPR at the initial point of pragmatics are likely to resolve crises including nagging skepticism. Does this happen at the international level? Not for sure if COP or BRIC or G7 etc. bodies are considered for their environmental literacy in what they aim at (mostly well offenses of few). What about the UN? The UN does succeed or has a stronger chance to succeed in showing the 'acute' problem of residual patriarchy has been banished though that is a big challenge; perhaps the biggest UN has ever imagined when its machinery has to be oiled for mechanisms expected of it. Yet, what can it do and that it must are resolutions of the contentious issues because UN is the last democratic straw to communicate and come to consensus. Norton and Habermas need to note that though attitudinal change may not be necessarily correlative to behavioral change, a change in patriarchal attitude in governance is correlative to drastic change in mechanics of value-resolution because it is a shift from hard-core environmental pragmatics to adopt a more rational and ethical pre-pragmatic research (HPR) to move to pragmatics and then to environmental citizenship.

The UN need to spur its responsible bodies of the local and global levels to find out HPR mechanism and sharpen it as a civil citizens' movement in which experts responsible at various levels of decision-making and policy formulation enrich their factual and moral vocabulary in-and-with-people so that ecological and environmental good looks to be a strong possibility with sustained peace. The ways in which UN bodies need to motivate people's participation in value-based living and value-resolution is interesting to find out.

NOTES

1. The UNEP project: From Conflict to Peace-building the role of natural resources and the environment is a joint product of UNEP and the Expert Advisory Group, coauthored by Richard Mathew and David Jensen and first published in February 2009 by the *UNEP*.

2. The ULL Report on Linking Environment and Conflict Prevention – The Role of the United Nations is coauthored by Simon A. Mason, Adrian Muller of CSS, Zurich and Albrecht Schnabel, RinaAlluri, Christian Schmid of Swisspeace, Bern, supervised by Andres Wenger and Victor Mauer of CSS and Laurent Goetschel of Swiss peace. Published by *CSS and Swisspeace,* 2008.

3. The UNIFT for Prevention Action or FT Report on Renewable Resources and Conflict has been prepared by *UNEP* and published in 2012. I have prepared the II and the III Synoptic Presentations drawn from this Report, pp. 26-27.

4. CPDSINDIA Report on Environmental Conflicts in India has been accessed by me through

www.cpdsindia.org/environmentalconflictsinindia.htm, authored by. Dharitree Dwivedy and Arbind Acharya.

5. EJ Atlas of 24 December 2018 reports that in cases of high intensity conflicts in India, direct violence causing severe bodily harm and death are noticeable. The occurrence of deaths are in some cases multiple.

6. Bryan Norton thinks that attitudinal change on contentious environmental issues and correlative motivation to change to sustainable behavior are enabled by incentives, which Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein calls 'nudging' in their work Nudge. Improving Decision about Health, Wealth and Happiness (London, Penguine, 2009).

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Nature of Analytical Philosophy

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Abstract

This paper examines the nature of analytical philosophy, its need and the importance in the contemporary world. In this write up I will investigate the role of logic, mind and language in the field of analytical philosophy. It further determines the development of clarification of complex statements into simple statements. What makes analytical philosophy unique and what are the major significance that differentiates analytical philosophy from philosophy of mind, philosophy of logic and philosophy of language. Analytical philosophy is the process of analysis in which we proceed from complexity to simplicity and clarity. In analytical philosophy, philosophers are using analytical method to uncover those truths of the world and realitywhich are covered with linguistic ambiguity. Language plays an important role in analytical philosophy because the clarification and simplification is the business of analytical philosophy. World is made up of facts and facts are expressed and analyzed in language. Language is the representation of the world. I will also show the major contribution of analytical philosophers in explaining atomic world.

Keywords: Analytical Philosophy; Language; Logic; Mind; Analysis.

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Introduction

Analytic philosophy was practiced by Plato and reinterpreted in the modern era by Descartes. Descartes envisaged language to be the sign of thought (Sayre, 1976, p. 187). It was revived in two centers; Germany and England. In Germany GottlobFrege was exploring the foundations of mathematics and logic. His efforts introduced new standards of rigidity that made their way into analytic philosophy. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*can be regarded as the peak of early period of analytic philosophy.[4]Generally, through the work of Russell and Wittgenstein; Frege's nature of language and logic has also become influential tools in the hands of later philosophies. In England, G. E. Moore on the contrary side started the analytic philosophy. He opposed British idealism and their claims *EsseestPecipi* in his Article *Refutation of idealism (1903)*. A critical part of that argument is what Moore's claims about the concept of the sensation of yellow which contains two parts: the sensation that is unique to each person and the yellowness that can be perceived by many people, even when idealists enclosed that there was some kind of duality here, they insisted on a kind of inseparability. However, Analysis was first used by the Greek philosopher Aristotle in his work '*Posterior Analytics'*.

Analytical philosophy is the branch of philosophy which attempts to examine and explore linguistic problems, logical problems, problems of mind. It has two strands; one emerged from Cambridge and other from Oxford. The philosophers in Cambridge side are Dummet, Quine, and Davidson and others who are from Oxford side are Austin, Urmson, and John Searle. Moreover the most important philosophical discipline which was developed in analytical philosophy is logical positivism which has brought significant verification of traditional philosophical theories to find logical relations, analysis and reference. Logical positivism has developed into two wings; Right wing and Left wing. Those philosophers who were associated with Right wing are Moritz Schlick and Waismann and they are known as Conservative Right Wing. They recognized liberalization and empiricism. However, the philosophers who were associated with Left Wing are Carnap and Neurath. They are known as Radical Left wing and they stressed on Fallibilism and Pragmaticism.

During the first half of the twentieth century, primarily in Great Britain and German speaking countries and later in North American, Australia and New Zealand, conceptual analysis was stressed and practiced which aims at "to break down complex concepts into simple concepts". According to Moore, the process might lead ultimately to simple concepts of which no further analysis could be given. The designation that conceptual was supposed to distinguish the philosophical activity from various analysis applied to non-conceptual objects. Analytical physics break down atoms into protons, neutrons and electrons. Analytic Chemistry splits chemical compositions. Analytical mathematics breaks down numbers into rational, complex, irrational, and natural

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numbers. The analogy between the philosophy and science inspired the name 'logical atomism',a theory that flourished between 1920 and 1930. Wittgenstein and Russell maintained that there must be simple, un-analyzable objects at the fundamental level of reality. Wittgenstein thought that the simples existed independently of human experience. A sentence is meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable. For philosophical problem arise when language is used customarily. Wittgenstein questioned many of the assumptions of analytic philosophy from the nature and necessity of analysis to the nature of language. His oracular aphorisms such as 'don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use' and 'to understand a sentence is to understand a language'. Once when Gilbert Harman was asked 'what is analytic philosophy'? He said (tongue firmly in cheek) analytic philosophy is who you have lunch with? The famous analytical philosophers are Moore, Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein,Quine, Davidson, Kripke, and Chomsky.[5]

Frege is known as Grandfather of Analytical philosophy (Sosa, 2001). Frege's work on the philosophy of mathematics provides the explanation of how deductive reasoning can extend our knowledge and a conception of the significance as well as the application of a theory to its foundations. It also challenges us to say on what our recognition of mathematical truth rests, if not on pure logic or more generally, on purely conceptual truths. It is believed that Moore, Russell rebelled against Kant and Hegel. According to Russell 'all mathematics is a symbolic logic'.[6] According to Wittgenstein, every mental image is a physical thing. I have a pain means that pain resides in things not a mental kind. There is no yellow or red color; it is actually the sensations of the objects which are giving us different colored impressions. Likely Frege gave the answer of the question 'what is the number one' in his work 'The foundations of arithmetic' and gave the answer that number one is a thing. It is the thing which is counted as one but not the number.[7]

Wittgenstein thought that it is just an ultimate fact about human beings that they find certain a priori inferences natural. Logicians are chiefly concerned with language used informatively in affirming or denying propositions, formulating arguments, evaluating arguments, and so on. Many other purposes are also served by language, however, and its informative use may be better understood when contrasted with other uses. The great philosopherof analytical tradition and notable logician insisted rightly in his work (*Philosophical Investigations, 1953)*that there are countless different kinds of use of what we call 'symbols', 'words', and 'sentences'. Among the examples suggested by Wittgenstein are giving orders, describing an object or giving its measurements, reporting an event, speculating about an event, forming and testing a hypothesis, presenting the results of an experiment, making up a story, play-acting, singing, guessing riddles, telling a joke, solving a problem in arithmetic, translating

from one language into another, asking, cursing, greeting and praying. The object of analysis were said to be concepts or propositions, but by the 1930's a *linguistic turn* became clearly noticeable and language came to be regarded as the fundamental object of analysis. Analytic philosophers were often called as linguistic early in the 20th century. Two English philosophers, Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead collaborated on the treatise known as *Principia Mathematica*which elaborates the fundamental rethinking of the relationship between mathematics and logic. In their *Principia*, Russell and Whitehead wanted to show that mathematics could ultimately reduced to logical principles. Among the techniques they developed was the use of the notational system of algebra, called Boolean notation, for expressing argument forms. Russell and Whitehead hoped Boolean notation could bring clarity to logic that therefore had been expressed only in natural languages, and in many respects they succeeded, developing a new form of logical expression called symbolic logic.

Symbolic logic is a many valued system; statements are either true or false. There is also three valued system in logic (true, false and undetermined), and model logic; which shows the logical relations among 'necessarily p', 'in fact p', and 'may be p', Tense logic, sometimes called fuzzy or vagueness'.[8]Logic goes beyond truth-functional and analysis to develop decision procedures when truth values are more ambiguous. Computers are not about using numbers and computations but it is about logic, and computer code is a series of statements involving logical connections.[9]Hence,Russell said about analysis as:

"The reason that I call my doctrine logical atomism is because the atoms that I wish to arrive at as the sort of last residue in analysis is logical atoms and not physical atoms. Some of them will be what I call 'particulars' such things as little patches of colors or sounds, momentary things and some of them will be predicates or relations and so on. The point is that the atom I wish to arrive at is the atom of logical analysis, not the atom of physical analysis. The process of sound philosophizing, to my mind, consist mainly in passing from those obvious, vague, ambiguous things, that we feel quite sure of, to something precise, clear, definite, which by reflection and analysis we find is involved in the vague thing that we start from, and is, so to speak, the real truth of which that vague thing is a sort of shadow".(Russell B. , 1921)

According to Russell; 'language come first and thought follows its footsteps' (Waldron, 1985). He didn't admit the possibility of synthetic a-priori knowledge (Gerwert, 1998, p. 49). In contemporary period, logic contains three main aspects, constructive, critical and theoretical. Logic is concerned with all forms of symbolic reference and with the semantic function of language. Consequently all valid uses of language are logical, and all invalid uses can be shown to be such only by logical analysis. Logic is intrinsic to language at every stage of its development from primitive symbolization to the most

elaborate forms of theoretical discourse. Thus language hypothesis and logic are inseparable.[10] Wittgenstein assumes that to understand a language is to take in a symbolism as a whole(Wittgenstein L. , Philosophical Grammar, 1974).

Chomsky's philosophy of mind rests directly on philosophy of grammar. The term 'grammar' was used, in the 1960s, which refers not only a linguist's description of a language, but to the basic knowledge of linguistic structures that every speaker of a language has acquired it in infancy. The central issues of linguistic theory are then posed as follows. First, we must ask what grammars are like: what form does a speaker's basic knowledge of a language take? Second, we have to ask how speakers do in fact acquire this knowledge. Chomsky's answer to the second question largely reflects his answer to first, and both are central to his view of mind in general.[11] According to Chomsky, 'certain well-founded conclusions about the nature of language are relevant to the problem of how knowledge is acquired and how the character of human knowledge is determined by certain general properties of the mind'. Chomsky elsewhere claims that these conclusions support 'what might fairly be called a rationalist conception of the acquisition of knowledge', as opposed, in particular, to an empiricist one. More specifically, he suggests that 'contemporary research (in linguistic) supports a theory of psychologically a-priori principles that bears a striking resemblance to the classical doctrine of innate ideas'. Katz, among others joins Chomsky in making such claims, declaring that 'adequate is now known in the theory of language to afford a substantial basis for deciding between the empiricist and rationalist hypothesis', and concluding that such a decision favors a rationalist account of human learning. Cooper has argued, for instance, that Chomsky's neo-rationalism is dissimilar enough from the rationalism of Descartes and Leibnitz so that 'there is little of philosophical contention in Chomsky's doctrine'. According to subjectivism, a grammar of a language describes the psychological basis of linguistic competence. According to linguistic mentalism, individual's knowledge of a grammar provides the (psychological) basis for their linguistic competence. Linguistic mentalism is, then, just that version of linguistic subjectivism according to which a grammar provides the psychological basis for linguistic competence because it is known by the language user whose competence it describes. Linguistic mentalism, in other words, is just a species of linguistic subjectivism. The traditional philosophical debate between empiricists and rationalists was, however, not concerned with questions about the existence of innate mental structures of faculties. This debate was concerned with questions about the existence of innate ideas and innate knowledge.[12] According to linguistic mentalism, language users know the grammar of their language. It seems more valuable here to consider what a grammar is taken by linguists and what kind of knowledge of a grammar does linguistic mentalists attribute to language users.

Kant revolutionized philosophical psychology by soliciting how our experience of the causal connection of events is possible, given that no such connection is manifested in sensation; and by answering that it is the human mind which imposes a causal connection between events which are in sensation merely successive. Likewise, Chomsky revolutionized linguistics by asking how our perceptions of the structure of sentence is possible, given that this structure may be nowhere openly marked in the sound signal which impinges on us; and by answering that the language-user imposes perceptual structure on events which are in sensation linguistically unstructured. The force of this common approach is to highlight that the individual is an active interpreter, rather than a merely passive recipient of sensations.[13]

Analysis of Mind

Noam Chomsky described mind as the capacity and ability to learn, think, reason, doubt, perceive and so on. Wittgenstein uttered that ability is the state or mental process. Ability can mean various things.[14] He thought that in order to understand the mind, it is useful to consider the less controversial question of how we study a complex physical system such as the human body. We assume that the species is characterized by a certain biological endowment. The embryo grows to the adult as its genetic program unfolds under the triggering and controlling effect of environment. The organism does not learn to grow arms or reach puberty. Rather, the general course of maturation is genetically determined, though the realization of the genetic plan depends in part on external factors. The result is a system of interacting organs; the heart, the visual system, etc. each with its structure and functions interacting in largely predetermined ways' (Gregory, 1987). What actually is the 'world of mind' or the 'world of consciousness?' There we would like to say: 'what goes on in my mind, what is going on in it now, what I see, hear. Couldn't we simply say 'what I am now seeing'? Wittgenstein's arguments on privacy show that a reconsideration of our approach to the inner is necessary; however, the attempts carry out this task clashes with some of our deepest philosophical prejudices.[15] The main source of resistance is the feeling that Wittgenstein's approach denies the essence of our experience. Take a belief, for example. What is the content of consciousness when someone believes something? The normal suggestion is that believing something involves having a mental image which corresponds to the belief. Wittgenstein considered belief like;

One would like to say: "Everything speaks for, and nothing against the earth's having existed long before" Yet might I not believe the contrary after all? But the question is: What would the practical effects of this belief be? Perhaps someone says: "That's not the point. A belief is what it is whether it has any practical effects or not." One thinks: It is the same adjustment of the human mind anyway. "I know" has a primitive

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meaning similar to and related to "I see" and "I knew he was in the room, but he wasn't in the room" is like "I saw him in the room, but he wasn't there". "I know" is supposed to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition like "I believe") but between me and a fact, so that the fact is taken into my consciousness. (Here is the reason why one wants to say that nothing that goes on in the outer world is really known, but only what happens in the domain of what are called sense-data.) This would give us a picture of knowing as the perception of an outer event through visual rays which project it as it is into the eye and the consciousness. Only then the question at once arises whether one can be certain of this projection. And this picture does indeed show how our imagination presents knowledge, but not what lies at the bottom of this presentation. If Moore says he knows the earth existed etc., most of us will grant him that it has existed all that time, and also believe him when he says he is convinced of it. But has he also got the right ground for this conviction? For if not, then after all he doesn't know (Wittgenstein L. , On Certainty, 1969)

Wittgenstein analysis of mind divides into intensions, beliefs, sensations and experience. When Hume divides experience into ideas and impressions, he takes the example of the mental image as his model for an impression and treats ideas as copies of these impressions. In this sense, impressions and more particularly visual sense impressions come to be treated as the paradigm of the world of the mind. Hume defined 'mind just like a theatre in which the ideas are the players'.[16]If mind assigns meaning to language, so also language enables and channels mind. Acquiring and trafficking in a language brings one concepts, thoughts and habits of thought, with all sorts of consequence. Indeed, having language is so crucial to our ability to frame the sophisticated thoughts that appear essential to language-use and understanding that many doubts whether Mind is 'prior' to language in any interesting sense.[17]

The three main themes in Wittgenstein's philosophy are:

i)   The multiplicity or heterogeneity of mental concepts.

ii)   The misapprehension of the essential privacy of states of consciousness.

iii) The nature and basis of mental representation or intentionality.[18]

There are many mental activities and attributes like; abstraction, understanding, willing, thinking, judging, doubting, but the three basic mental activities are thinking, willing, and judging (Arendt, 1971, p. 69). The main characteristic of mental activities is their invisibility. Properly speaking, they never appear, though they manifest themselves into thinking, willing, or judging ego, which is aware of being active, yet lacks the ability or the urge to appear as such.[19]The bold assertion that mental phenomena are entirely natural and caused by the Neuro-physiological activities of the brain is one of the theories. Russell asked us to consider a blind physicist who knows all of physics

but doesn't know something we know: What it's like to see the color blue: It is obvious that a man who can see knows things which a blind man cannot know; but a blind man can know the whole of physics. Thus the knowledge which other men have and he has not is not part of physics. Russell's climax was that the natural sciences seek to discover 'the causal skeleton of the world'. 'Other aspects lie beyond their purview' opening the door to novel and promising inquiries, a rejection of Cartesian mind-body dualism (Chomsky, On Mind and Language, 2007, pp. 12-14). Churchland argued that telepathy (mind reading), precognition (seeing the future), telekinesis (thought control of material objects), and clairvoyance (knowledge of distant objects); are mental processes as well as non physical.[20]

We seem to have no doubt that pains, moods, images, and sentences which 'flash before the mind', dreams, hallucinations, beliefs, attitudes, desires, and intentions all count as 'mental' whereas the contractions of the stomach which cause the pain, the neural processes which accompany it, and everything else which can be given a firm location within the body count as non-mental. Our unhesitating classification suggests that not only have we a clear intuition of what 'mentality' is, but that it has something to do with non-spatiality and with the notion thateven if the body were destroyed the mental entities or states might somehow remain. Even if we discard the notion of 'mind-stuff", even if we drop the notion of (*res cogitans*) as subject of predication, we seem able to distinguish mind from body nonetheless, and to do so in a more or less Cartesian way.

These professed intuitions serve to keep something like Cartesian dualism alive. Post-Wittgensteinian philosophers who oppose behaviorism and materialism tend to grant to Wittgenstein and Strawson that in some sense there is nothing there but the human organism, and that we must give up the notion of this organism as made out of a bit of (*res cogitans*) non-spatially associated with a bit of (*res extensa*). But, they say, the Cartesian intuition that the mental-physical distinction is unbridgeable by empirical means, that a mental state is no more like a disposition than it is like a neuron, and that no scientific discovery can reveal an identity remains. This intuition seems to them enough to establish an unbridgeable gap. But such neo-dualist philosophers are embarrassed by their own conclusions, since although their metaphysical intuitions seem to be Cartesian; they are not clear whether they are entitled to have such things as 'metaphysical intuitions'. They tend to be unhappy, with the notion of a method of knowing about the world prior to and untouchable by empirical science (Rorty, 1979).

The mind is what the brain does; specifically, the brain processes information, and thinking is a kind of computation. The mind is organized into modules or mental organs, each with a specialized design that makes it an expert in one arena of interaction with the world. The modules of basic logic are specified by our genetic program. Their

operation was shaped by natural selection to solve the problems of the hunting and gathering life led by our ancestors in most of our evolutionary history. The various problems for our ancestors were subtasks of one big problem for their genes, maximizing the number of copies that made it into the next generation.[21]

Wittgenstein held that In physics we may have an idea of certain processes going on inside elementary particles, but we may also think that we understand neither these processes nor the particles well enough, and so we see ourselves as struggling with yet unknown processes in a yet unexplored medium. Now we turn to mental phenomena and start talking about them, as if they, too, were yet unknown processes in a yet unexplored medium. We think of these processes as going on 'in the mind' and then include that the mind is something ethereal and difficult to understand. But, Wittgenstein suggests, the assumed analogy between the problems of physics and our questions about the mind is false and quickly falls apart. He does not tell us immediately how the analogy fails, but he is sure that it is mistaken and that it is only this mistaken analogy that drives us into our usual views about the mind. In order to understand how talk about physical particles differs from talk about the mind and its states and processes, we must look more closely at how statements about the human body are connected to psychological utterances. Here we must distinguish two cases: the case where we are speaking about a third person (He is in pain) and the case where we are speaking in the first person (I am in pain). He tells us, accordingly, that 'My own relation to my words is wholly different from other people's'. When I say of someone else that he is in pain, I depend directly on the availability of outer criteria for my assertion. I say that he is in pain because I see his pain-behavior (Hans Sluga and David, 1996). Accordingly, Wittgenstein writes about state of mind as:

"I noticed that he was out of humor." Is this a report about his behavior or his state of mind?..... Both not side-by-side however but about the one via the other. A doctor asks: 'How is he feeling?' The nurse says: 'He is groaning'. A report on his behavior (PI, p. 179).[22]

Analysis of Logic

The contemporary method of analysis for the first time appeared in Russell's philosophy. Who is notably known for his logical analysis, he states that language misleads us both by its 'vocabulary' and by its 'syntax'. His theory of description is the best example of an analysis which undermines the metaphysical claims of realists. Moore and Russell agreed that the aim of philosophical analysis is to uncover the fundamental constituents of propositions. Russell understood this within a broader program of logical analysis.[23]Russell and Moore rebelled against British idealism which became the base of origin of analytical philosophy. Russell himself announced that all sound philosophy

should begin with an analysis of propositions.[24] Russell attacked the problem of Nominalists-realist controversy over the existence and nature of universals by distinguished two types of symbols viz. subject-symbols and incomplete symbols (which are not meaningful in isolation). Excited with the success of philosophical application of logical technique, he came to believe that the grammar of ordinary language ought to be replaced by the strict syntax of logic combined with scientific terminology. Thus in his view, an ideal language or a logical-scientific language could be constructed, and it would reflect the nature of reality. Moore as the Cambridge analyst philosopher declared that he could solve philosophical problem, not by logical manipulations or by scientific methods, but by paying close attention to common sense and its language. Wittgenstein claims that the chief aim of philosophical activity is the logical classification of ideas rather than the formulation of theories, classification means to make explicit what is implicit in concepts. For Moore, 'conceptual classification' is the sole conclusion of philosophical analysis. We can easily discover at least two distinct uses of classifying analysis; one is to make obvious the hidden contradictions in philosophical theory. The purpose of such analysis is the testing of their truth-values. Russell also accepts the value of classifying analysis. According to him the most important part of the business of philosophy consists in criticizing and classifying notion which is apt to be regarded as fundamental and accepted uncritically. Wittgenstein strongly asserts that the result of philosophy is not a number of philosophical proposition but to make propositions clear. Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein and other logical positivists attempt to abandon speculative philosophy and set down the base for experimental philosophy. These philosophers are agreed on the assumption that the aim of philosophical analysis is to uncover the fundamental constituents of propositions atoms of the world. However, philosophy is classification, whether it is the classification or the meaning of concepts or terms, propositions or statements and whether it is the classification of uses or rules of language. Philosophy is the analysis of language in both its semantical and syntactical aspect. Analysis for Wittgenstein is a form of 'linguistic transformation'. According to Carnap, Philosophy as engaged in the analysis of language of science, is a meta-science propounding meta-theories in meta-language. The analysis of the linguistic expressions of science is called by Carnap'logic of science'. It consists of two branches via logical syntax or formal analysis and semantic analysis while former studies the forms of linguistic expressions and latter considers the relations of linguistic expressions to objects designated by them. The purpose according to Carnap is analysis, interpretation, classification, or construction of language of communication, especially language of science. In the past, Plato and Aristotle adopted "semanticalanalysis" and in modern times, C. S. Pierce andFrege carried out semanticalanalysis on the basis of modern logic.[25]Following Russell and Wittgenstein, and like other members of the Vienna Circle, Carnap maintained that logical analysis is an essential tool for the clarification of

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language. Its application to the sentences of traditional philosophy reveals some deeply entrenched illusions that deceive us, and which philosophers have often fallen prey to. While sharing the diagnosis, Carnap had his own ideas on the kind of cure that philosophy needs. Particularly damaging, according to him, is the confusion between questions, which pertain to some domain of objects, and logicalquestions, which are concerned with terms, sentences, theories, and other linguistic elements which refer to the objects in the domain under consideration. Many problems of traditional philosophy which look like questions about object, Carnap maintained, are actually logical questions, and they should be treated as such. Philosophers are liable to such confusion, and they often entertain the illusion that they talk about things. When logical analysis reveals that what they say concerns the form of language. This easily leads to pseudo-problems, talks at cross purpose, and endless disputes. One important aspect of Carnap's program is to provide a cure for this kind of trouble. So, all traditional philosophical problems are not systematically eliminated as such. It looks to me that the material mode of speech is ambiguous and problematic because of its common use of language. Butit looks scientific to introduce formal mode of speech which should be clear and simple and which prevents us from falling into some of the logical traps of world-languages. This mode of speech depends on a logical method which provides, essentially, a system of sharply defined concepts, to be used as tools for logical clarification; 'Analytic', 'synthetic', 'valid', 'contradictory', 'logical', 'consequence', 'derivable', 'equipollent', and 'implication', are typical examples of concepts belonging to this system.[26]Wittgenstein said that 'To interpret is to think, to do something; seeing is a state, That is, seeing has genuine duration: one can ask for how long one saw the drawing as a duck before it changed to a rabbit, whereas it sounds inconsistent to ask for the duration of an interpretation.[27]Wittgenstein has often taken to arguing that thought is impossible unless certain specified relations hold between the individual and society. However, he assumed that thought is normative (Hawthorne, 1994).

There is no universal logic that covers all aspects of linguistic meaning and characterizes all valid arguments or relationships between the meanings of linguistic expressions. Different logical systems have been and are being developed for linguistic semantics and the best known along with widespread is predicate logic, in which properties of sets of objects can be expressed via predicates, logical connectives, and quantifiers. This is done by providing 'syntax' (i.e., a specification of how the elements of the logical language can be combined to form well-formed logical expressions) and a 'semantics' (an interpretation of the logical expressions, a specification of what these expressions mean within the logical system). Examples of predicate logic representations are given in (2a) and (2b), which represent the semantic interpretation or meaning of the sentences in (1a) and (2a), respectively. In these formulae, x is a 'variable,' k a 'term' (denoting a particular object or entity), politician, philosopher, like, etc. are

predicates (of different kind), '"', '!, are 'connectives[28],' and ", "are the existential quantifier and universal quantifier, respectively. Negation can also be expressed in predicate logic, using the symbol âÿ or curl.

1) a. Some politicians are Philosophers.

b. "x (politician(x) '" Philosophers(x))

(There is an x (at least one) so that x is a politician and x is Philosopher).

(2) a. All Australian students like Ricky Pointing.

b. "x ((student(x) '" Australian(x))'!like(x, R))

(For all x with x being a student and Australian, x likes Ricky Pointing).

Notice that, as mentioned, there is no analysis of the meanings of the predicates, which correspond to the lexical items in the original sentences, for example, politician, philosopher, student, etc. Notice also the "constructed" and somewhat artificial sounding character of the example sentences concerned, which is typical of much work in the logical tradition (Schalley, 2010).

Analysis of Language

According to Chomsky, language faculty is in the human beings just as in the sense they have visual and auditory faculties (Otero, 1994, p. 435). We must acknowledge that a language is essentially a set of items, what Hudson calls 'linguistic items,' such entities as sounds, words, grammatical structures, and so on. It is these items, their status, and their arrangements that language theorists such as Chomsky concern themselves with.[29] Language is not innately given (Innatism) nor is it an externally given (empiricism). It is the creation of a composite evolutionary process, it is rather the means whereby we systematize our experience and learn to think. If we misuse it, we lead ourselves lost. If we use it rightly we achieve understanding. Language provides each of us with a new symbolic dimension which enables us to examine, associate, enhance and even it correctsour information which could be of purely sensory origin. Man differs from other creatures by this very faculty. If we are ever to understand ourselves, therefore we need to understand how this faculty arises, how it develops, and when we misuse it we fall into error and fallacy.[30] Language and languages are extra-human entities with a remarkable capacity to evolve and adapt with respect to human masses. As Humboldt arguably holds that Language is 'infinite use of finite means'. These creatures are not only extra-human, but apparently outside the biological world altogether.[31]Chomsky studied linguistics and also obtained a thorough grounding in mathematics, logic and philosophy. He spent much productive time with philosophers like Quine, John Austin and Nelson Goodman. This unusual combination would be a significant factor in his subsequent intellectual breakthrough. As Alfred North Whitehead

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once observed, 'novel ideas are more appropriate to spring from an unusual collection of knowledge, not necessarily from vast knowledge, but from a thorough conception of the methods and ideas of distinct lines of thought (Fernandes, 2005).

We may think of the theorist as given an empirical pairing of collections of primary linguistic data associated with grammars that are constructed by the device on the bases of such data, much information can be obtained about the primary data that constitute the input and the grammar that is the 'output' of such a device and the theorist has the problem of determining the intrinsic properties of a device capable of mediating this input-output connection. The empiricist approach has understood that the structure of the acquisition device is limited to certain elementary 'perceptual processing mechanism' for e.g. in recent times, an innate 'quality space' with an innate 'distance' defined on it as per Quine's knowledge of innatism. The device has certain analytical data processing mechanism or inductive principles of a very elementary kind, for example, certain principles of association, weak principles of 'generalization' involving gradients along the dimensions of the given quality space, or in our case, taxonomic principles of segmentation and classification such as those that have been developed with some case in modern linguistics. According to rationalists about mental processes, held that beyond the peripheral processing mechanisms, there are innate ideas and principles of various kinds that determine the form of the acquired knowledge. A condition for innate mechanisms to become activated is that suitable stimulation must be presented. Thus for Descartes, the innate ideas are those arising from the faculty of thinking rather than from external objects. Chomsky further argued that from the ideas of ideas, it is described that 'nothing examines our mind from external objects through the organs of sense beyond certain corporeal movements', but even these movements, and the figures which arise from them, are not conceived by us in the shape they assume in the organs of sense, hence it follows that the ideas of the movement and figures are themselves innate in us, so the ideas of pain, color, sound, and the like be innate, that our mind may, on occasion of certain corporeal movements, envisage these ideas, for they have no likeness to the physical movements. Sight presents nothing beyond pictures, and hearing nothing beyond voices or sounds, so that all these things that we think of beyond their voices or pictures, as being symbolized by them, are presented to us by means of ideas which come from no other source than our faculty of thinking, and are accordingly together with that faculty innate in us, that is always existing in us potentially, for existence in any faculty is not actual but merely potential existence, since the very word "faculty" designates nothing more or less than a potentiality. Thus ideas are innate in the sense that in some faculty's generosity is, innate diseases like gout or gravel, not that on this account the babies of the families suffer from these diseases in their mother's womb, but because they are born with a certain disposition or inclination for contracting them.[32]

The main questions regarding language are

i)   What constitutes knowledge of language?

ii) How is knowledge of language acquired?

iii) How is knowledge of language put to use?

In Chomsky's work 'Language and problems of knowledge' the fundamental four questions arise in the study of language; the above three questions and fourth which is:

iv) What are the physical mechanisms involved in the representation, acquisition, and use of this language.

The answer to the first question is basically descriptive: in pursuing it, we attempt to construct a grammar, a theory of particular language that describes how this language assigns specific mental representations to each linguistic expression, determining its form and meaning. The second is a logical question but Chomsky explained it as to construct a universal grammar and to set parameters for its acquisition. But it seems to me that Chomsky would provide good thesis if he would have used the analysis accessed by Kant; that knowledge of the language can be acquired by the synthesis of sensation and reflection.[33]Language learning is not really something that the child does; it is something that happens to the child placed in an appropriate environment, much as the child's body grows and matures in a predetermined way when provided with appropriate nutrition and environmental stimulation.[34]The language that constitutes the proper object of linguistic study is internalized language (I-language), distinguished by Chomsky from socially shareable, public 'external' language used within a given community (E-language). The former is individual, internal, intentional language, specific to each individual person, constituting a part of their mental endowment; it is comprised of computational procedures and a lexicon. The latter is simply an idealized object, commonly called Polish, English, Chinese, Arabic, Kashmiri, Urdu, Hebrew, etc., that has no ontological status of its own (is just a characteristic epiphenomenon). Grammar in this context is a linguistic theory which contains objects in I-language.[35]

Conclusion

Thus the nature of analytical philosophy is analytical which studies the clarification, form and meaning of the propositions. Its attitude and methodology depends upon the scientific investigation and verification of the problems. Analytical philosophy has brought world so close and simplified that today every complex problem can be resolved through analysis. The chief task of analytical philosophy is to break down complex problems of philosophy into simple ones. It has not only resolved problems in

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philosophy discipline rather it has resolved complex problems in other disciplines like education, sociology, physics, chemistry, Biology, Anthropology, mathematics and so on. In philosophy, analytical philosophy has brought revolution in other fields of philosophy, like philosophy of mind, philosophy of logic and philosophy of language.

Consequently, analytical philosophy appeared as an instrument to comprehend those philosophical problems which were being measured as vacuous and ambiguous. These problems have occurred only due to ordinary language use in our diversified speech and location. However, language is the manifestation of our thoughts. Analytical philosophers has assumed that all philosophical ideas are implicitly and explicitly stated in different languages and since these language have different forms and meanings contextually. So, it is necessary for a philosophical discourse to analyze and verify these languages. Ordinary language is full of errors and ambiguities that is why analytical philosophershave devised and developed scientific language or symbolic language. Analytical philosophy is a method of philosophy used by the philosophers from time to time. Nevertheless, analytical philosophy connects philosophy with practicality, verifiability, symbolism, form, language, thought, and meaning.

Thus the analysis of basic concepts has always been a major concern of philosophers. In the Dialogue of Plato, Socrates is represented as spending a great deal of his time asking questions, like 'What is truth', 'What is Knowledge', 'What is Justice', 'What is Virtue', and these questions are explored in an analytical approach. However, there are three importantly different ways of formulating a problem in analytical philosophy, whether we are dealing with causation, truth, and knowledge (moral obligation). To take the problem of knowledge of our model, we observe that first, we are investigating the nature of knowledge, second, we are analyzing the concept of knowledge, and third, we are trying to make explicit what one is saying when he says that he knows something to be the case. Therefore, the analytical philosophy is always concerned with language and it brings out basic features of the use or meaning of various words and forms of statement. It is essential for an analytical philosopher to proceed on the basis of some general conception of the nature of linguistic use and meaning. This becomes especially important when analytical philosophers become involved in frequent disputes over what a word means, or over whether two expressions or forms of expression have the same or different meaning.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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4 See, M. A. Beaney, What is Analytic Philosophy, p. 12.

5 A. P. Martinich& D. Sosa, (2001), p. 1-6.

6 Ibid., p. 18-24.

7 D. Pears, Questions in the Philosophy of Mind, 1975, pp. 98-109

8 Vagueness is a term, which is said to be vague if there are cases in which there is no definite answer as to whether the term applies i.e. 'middle aged is vague'. At the age 5 and age 80, one is not middle-aged at age 50. Therefore, following statements involve literal and metaphysical uses of words.

9 D. Stewart & H. G. Blocker, Fundamentals of Philosophy, 98-100.

10 Waldron. (1985), p. 153-56.

11 Matthews. (1994), p. 550.

12 F. D'Agostino. (1986), p. 61-65.

13 Ibid., p. 65.

14 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, p. 6.

15 Paul Johnston. (1993), p. 33-37

16 N. Chomsky, Modular Approaches to the Study of the Mind, p. 23.

17 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, version 1.0, London/New York: Routledge, 1998, p 4536.

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20 See P. M. Churchland. (1999), p. 13.

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22 H. Sluga& D. G. Stern, (1996), p. 40.

23 M. A. Beaney, What is Analytic Philosophy, p. 7.

24 Ibid., p.9

25 C. Rai. (1980), p. 143-165.

26 See Logical Syntax of Language, in ed., Pierre Wagner, Palgrave: Macmillan, 2009, p.7.

27 See Soverin Schroeder, A tale of Two Problems: Wittgenstein's Discussion of Aspect's Perception, p. 359.

28 In symbolic logic we are using symbols; '", '!, ",",âÿ, which represents conjunction, implication, existential qauntifier, universal quantifier, and negation.

29 R. Wardhaugh. (2006), p.10.

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Language and Philosophy: Drawing the Limits

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Abstract

This paper is an attempt to unfold the intricacy of languagewhich gives a clear distinction between the surface and depth grammar of language. In the preface of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein states that philosophical problems arise out of the misunderstanding of logic of language. Such misunderstanding occurs because of the failure in differentiating the surface grammar from the deeper grammatical form. The discovery of the depth grammar of language is the task of philosophical investigation which is achieved by critiquing the language i.e. exploring its nature and functioning. So, philosophical problems are conceptual in nature rather than empirical. The method of analysis finds importance not only in *Tractatus* but also in his later works. Once we know how language works in everyday life, the conceptual confusions do not occur in philosophy.The job of philosopher is limited only to look into the working of language and not tempering it by offering any metaphysical constructs. Accordingly, philosophical analysis is limited only to the 'propositions of natural sciences' or 'empirical propositions'. An empirical proposition has sense if it fulfills bi-polar truth-conditions of language. By saying this, Wittgenstein delineates the limits of both — the language and the philosophical analysis.

Keywords : Philosophy, Science, Language, Logic, Grammar

Introduction

Interpreting Wittgensteinian writing can be classified differently than 'using it'. Nevertheless, the overlap between the business of 'interpretation' and 'use, does not take away the importance of talking them separately in many cases. Interpreters group have mostly been concerned with what Wittgenstein said or what he meant when he said 'so'. [Russell, Carnap, Anscombe, Hintikka, Hacker, Goldfarb, Shanker, Kripke,

Diamond, Putnamand many others could be categorized as belonging to the interpret-ers group.]For them reaching out to the author's intention and his historical, social, biographical context is foremost in order to arrive at their understanding of Wittgenstein. In contrast, the users of Wittgenstein draw insights from his writings and use the injunc-tions to advance them further and to build argumentsin their own Wittgensteinian way. [Rorty, Geertz, Pitkin, Toulmin have used Wittgenstein to further their positions in philosophy, sociology, anthropology, or political thought in an extended sense.]The author becomes less important in such case and the possibility of using the insights creates larger academic space for developing the views in various ways (Biletzki 2003: 1-18).

My stance, in this paper, is more inclined towards 'using Wittgenstein' andpropose argumentsto support the widely discussed Wittgensteinian claim on'philosophy as an activity.' Though, primacy is not given to interpretation, but in few places it becomes unavoidable, particularly when discussing thegenerally accepted views on 'philosophy via language and logic.'We draw the insights on these issues from his writings without getting over burdened by interpretative debates alone. Hence,the claim in this paper, is not about offering any original interpretation of Wittgenstein, rather we attempt to make use of his insights on 'language and philosophy'to further it in some little way.

In the preface of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein states that philosophical problems arise out of the misunderstanding of logic of language. This is precisely because every-day language is quite complicated and;

> It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is. Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely
>
> different purposes (*TLP*#4.002).

Logic lies beneath the language and therefore, it is not possible to grasp the real form of language without grasping its logic. The ordinary language does not show its logical structure properly as the apparent form seems to be the real. It is not possible to gather immediately from the apparent form of language what its underlying logic or grammar is. Once the logic ('logic' in the *Tractatus* is the associate of 'grammar' in the *Philosophical Investigations*)of language is grasped, the philosophical problems get resolved. In that sense, the philosophical problems are not genuine problems but kind of misunderstanding occurs due to the failure in differentiating the surface grammar from the deeper grammatical form. "Philosophy is not a body of doctrine, but an activ-ity" (*TLP*#4.112). It is an activity of clarifying language and therefore, the role of phi-

losophy is a critique of language (*TLP*#4.0031).Wittgenstein assigns a limited role to philosophy which is only to do with clarification of language and it is no more a source of truth about the world the way science is.

Surface Grammar and Depth Grammar

Philosophical confusions, according to Wittgenstein arise when meaning of a word is arrived at out of the context of its use. Wittgenstein alleges that such mistakes have been committed in philosophy because "When language is looked at, what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made of the form of words" (*LC,* 2). When we look for meaning of words in sentence, we just understand their use at the surface level and fail to understand the depth structure of the grammar. As Wittgenstein proclaims, "We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday language-games because the clothing of our language makes everything alike" (*PI,*§224). That is the reason, why he concludes that philosophical confusions and problems are grammatical in nature. In order to unfold the intricacy of language, Wittgensteinmakes a clear distinction between the surface and depth grammar of language. Surface grammar lacks appropriate analysis of language and the meaning of word in a proposition is drawn without synthesis and discrimination. Such meaning of words would be superficial as it will miss out the various possible usages of words in different contexts. "For the surface grammar of expressions – that part that can be taken in at a glance, such as the distinctions between nouns, verbs and adjectives – isoften misleading" (Hacker 2001: 340). In philosophy we are suggested to be aware of the fact that we can easily be misguided by the surface grammar of expression when usages of the words are seen at the first glance.

Surface grammar is a grammar which operates the apparent structure of the language in everyday life whereasdepth grammar gives a real meaning to the words by unfolding the possibilities of its various usages. Without acknowledging various usages of words in different contexts, it is impossible to reach out at correct meaning of the words and sense of the proposition. Meaning of words is not taken to be fixed and *a priori.*

> The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language. ""Let us ask ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep? (And
>
> that is what the depth of philosophy is) (PI§111).

Hence, the job of philosophy is limited to clearing up the grammatical illusions and to provide a healthy atmosphere for having intellectual reflections.

Even though we may be able to use the words and practice the language correctly in our everyday life, but we may remain confused about the working of its grammar and hence in understanding the nature and function of language. The confusion occurs, not because language is insufficient in itself but because of our not having the clear view of the logic of language. So we cannot blame the language for philosophical confusions. Language is good enough the way it is. There is nothing wrong in ordinary language itself. The ordinary language is closer to everyday life. But when it is said to be giving rise to conceptual confusions in philosophy it is because of our misunderstanding of the grammar of language. The lack of clarity regarding grammar or logic misleads us when we look for meaning of the words in a proposition. We often overlook the distinction between the apparent and the real grammar in drawing the meaning of words in a given propositional context. The apparent or surface grammar of language fails to represent the multifarious ways of using the words in ordinary language. This gives rise to the possibility of misrepresentation and misunderstanding. To understand the real grammar of language and to have perspicuous representation of reality, a careful analysis of language becomes pertinent. It would make it clear how multiple usages of words would give rise to different meaning in different contexts. And that means, to know the working of language in everyday life. ,

An example here would help to clarify the distinction between the surface grammar and depth grammar. Compare the proposition: 'I have a pen' and 'I have pain'. If we look at these two sentences at surface level, there cannot be any grammatical difference between two expressions. Both sentences appear to have similar grammatical structure. At surface level, we look for the meaning from the ordinary use of words i.e. how the words are used from the structural point of view rather than their application. Here, we consider the structure or form of the words through use of words. If we look at these sentences at deeper level then we can find some grammatical difference between the two. The first proposition is empirical and experiential whereas the second proposition is neither empirical nor experiential, it is logical, or what Wittgenstein calls, conceptual or grammatical. The first proposition gives some information about the fact i.e. pen; but the second proposition does not give any information about fact rather states a rule governing the use of word 'pain'. That is to say, we cannot understand the second proposition unless or until we know the use of a word 'have'. In case of the first proposition 'I have a pen',it can also be said that I can sell it to somebody or exchange it. But in the case of second sentence, 'I have pain',similar expression would not make any sense. The way the first sentence is connected is different from the way the second sentence is connected. We can make out the different meanings of these two sentences

through various applications of the word 'have' in different contexts. It means a word is used in multi-dimensional ways. So we cannot understand the meaning of a word properly until or unless we know its various applications. Here, the word 'have' is same in both the sentences at surface level but at deeper level the word 'have' has different meaning in these two different expressions. Before using a word and its various applications, we have to know the rules or grammar that governs it. We cannot understand the meaning of words unless we know its grammar or rules which governs the use of words. Here, the boundary of the limits of the language usage is drawn in the order of criteria of 'use', 'purpose', 'practice', etc. So, "Our ordinary language, which of all possible notations is the one which pervades all our life, holds our mind rigidly in one position, as it were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire for other positions as well" (*BB*, 59). If we do not understand proper/complete functioning of language then it makes our mind cramped and rigid. We would come out of this rigidity when we start looking carefully at the functioning of language. It is like looking into the cabin of a locomotive to know how it functions differently than other moving machines (*PI*§12).

The apparent form of language conceals its real form giving rise to misunderstanding of the logic of language. The discovery of the real form of language is the task of philosophical investigation and that is why, it is claimed that philosophy is a critique of language which explores the nature and the function of language. The real form of language is responsible for the meaning of words in a given propositional context. In order to come up with meaning of words in a given propositional context we need to reveal the depth form of language by virtue of analysis of language. We need to go into the deeper level which lies beneath the surface. "Something that lies within, which we see when we look *into* the thing, and which an analysis digs out" (*PI*§92). Therefore, the method of analysis finds importance not only in *Tractatus* but also in his later works which reveal the deeper structure of meaning of sentence.

> Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language.—some of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this may be called an "analysis" of our forms of expression,
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> for the process is sometimes like one of taking a thing apart (*PI*§90).

When a comparison is made between the earlier and later writings of Wittgenstein, one is tempted to highlight the differences in the approach and understanding of the nature and functioning of the language. There have been debates for more than two

decades now between the classical Wittgensteinians[1] and new Wittgensteinians[2] on these issues. The first group highlights a serious divide between Wittgenstein's early and later works and the later group emphasizes more on seeing the thematic continuity in it. In agreement with new Wittgensteinians, we believe that highlighting the connections and continuation between Wittgenstein's works is very crucial to grasp and make use of his complex views on philosophy language, and logic. Without which it would be difficult to resolve the paradoxes we come across in his writings.

Wittgenstein defines the task of philosophy as offering clarification of language by a careful description of the use of words in language. It does not involve explaining the way language works. A word may have different meaning in different contexts depending on the linguistic conventions. One does not teach how language functions? How words are used meaningfully in different contexts which we often tend to forget when we engage in intellectual reflections. When we reflect upon the nature and functioning of language, the temptation is to look for uniformity in its functioning overlooking the multiple ways language is used meaningfully. Once we get the clarity on how language is practiced in everyday life, what is concealed and hidden gets revealed to us. The real form of language is the hidden grammar of a proposition in a given context. The grammar keeps on changing in accordance with the changein the context of linguistic usage. According to new Wittgensteinians, the possibility of introducing the new usages of a sign is always open, since everyday practices keep on changing. They emphasise on various usages of grammar of language rather than established rules of logical syntax of language. The kind of openness is given to the usages of language is somewhat missed out by the classical readers of Wittgenstein. In this regard, Wittgenstein states, "A main cause of philosophical disease– a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example"(*PI*§593). Understanding the sense of language in a very limited context and neglecting the multiple usages of its applications leads to philosophical problems. Wittgenstein's aim is to dissolve the philosophical problems by looking into the working of language. What is needed for the dissolution of philosophical problems is a rearrangement of what we already know i.e. the rules for the use of words. This way philosophy is purely descriptive – it describes the working of our language.

Method of Description

The correct method in philosophy, according to Wittgenstein, is "to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural sciences— i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy" (*TLP*#6.53). Philosophical analysis is limited only to the 'propositions of natural sciences' or 'empirical propositions' (*TLP*#4.001, 4.111). In the realm of philosophy no meaningful discourse is permissible beyond it. Proposi-

tions in this context must fulfil bi-polar conditions.By saying this, Wittgenstein delineates the limits of both — the language and the philosophical activity. The domain of language and the domain of philosophy here are only a systematic description of 'how things are'. By drawing these limitations, attempt is being made to explore the more significant issues in life which otherwise cannot be put within the framework of language and philosophy. They lie in realm of metaphysics. He rejects the traditional metaphysicians' approach to philosophy and suggests for purely descriptive method instead of offering explanations. To avoid conceptual confusions in philosophy he makes an important point as follows:

> Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosophers into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to
>
> explain anything. Philosophy really is 'purely descriptive' (BB, 18).

Philosophy does not give us pictures of reality or any theoretical model of reality. It is not an empirical discipline and does not investigate empirically anything in the world. It can neither confirm nor confute with scientific propositions. That is, philosophy is neither a body of true propositions such as physics or chemistry nor it entertains any sort of theory building activity. It cannot explain essential truths about world. The correct method in philosophy consists in abstaining from the theoretical constructions and explanations of metaphysical truths.

Wittgenstein aptly writes, "Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them)"(*TLP*#4.111). This remark clearly makes a distinction between the domain of philosophy and the domain of sciences and methods practiced by them. On this basis Wittgenstein rejects the traditional metaphysicians who pretend to be doing a kind of science by offering explanations and constructing metaphysical theories. Philosophy is most emphatically not science; it only describes carefully how language works in everyday life. We are suggested to do away with all explanations in philosophy. In this sense, philosophical problems which arise out of conceptual confusions cannot constitute a genuine debate.

Wittgenstein claims that in philosophy people who have been misled by language are prone to utter nonsensical statements. But this confusion of our intellect by means of language is not baseless.

> We can battle against it and show up the nonsense for what it is by careful description of the uses of language. Thus philosophers are either writers of nonsense or fighters of nonsense who only wish it to be seen for what it is. Science, on the other hand, holds custody of all knowledge (Gruender 1962: 526).

Science confines knowledge to empirical investigation which is based on certain established causal laws and theories. These general principles or theories explain the facts about the world. Therefore, achievement in science is the establishment of new theories. To ask why certain events occur in the world is asking for its justifications or explanations. For example, what makes balloons to rise in air? Why does high tide occur during the full moon? Explanations of why such events occur involve establishing casual principles or theories. Here explanations to these questions include (1) certain principles of nature (for first, a gas which is lighter per unit of volume than another gas will go upward; for second, the gravitational pull of moon is higher during the full moon day) and (2) certain particular events (for first, hydrogen or helium are lighter than the mixture of oxygen, carbon dioxide, nitrogen, etc., composing our atmosphere; and for second, during the full moon day moon is closer to earth and thereby, gravitational pull of moon affects the sea level more). These laws of nature are *apriori* to our experiences because they are true in all possible cases in time. Science offers explanation by establishing the logical relation between an event and the laws of nature. An explanation of a given phenomena aims to tell us something that we did not already know and contributes towards human knowledge.

Going by Wittgensteinian standpoint on philosophy, contrary to science, philosophy does not contribute towards human knowledge. Philosophy simply describes the facts which lie open to view. It does not concern about the phenomena as such rather clarifies our representation of them. Wittgenstein puts itaptly, "We feel as if we had to *penetrate* phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the '*possibilities*' of phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the *kind of statement* that we make about phenomena" (*PI*§90). Philosophy does not concern about the causal perceptions of the world but is to do with the world which is formed along with human practices. That is, the phenomenal world is not ready-made world but it gets constituted within the language-games. The world we talk about is not something given *a priori*; it is the one that is linguistically projected. Philosopher's understanding of the world is limited to it's logical aspect not the physical.

The logical or grammatical description cannot be of the universal or general form of language-use. It gives us only an *overview* of relationship between language and the world. Wittgenstein refutes the essentialists' position where words have definite meaning and can be defined in given terms. As in science, the word 'force' would have a fixed meaning as its definition. It does not leave any space for ambiguity when 'force' is defined as combination of 'mass' and 'acceleration'. This general definition is applicable in all possible cases in science. However, this craving for generality would lead to serious philosophical confusions in ordinary language. Wittgenstein's notion of game elucidates his emphasis very aptly.

Wittgenstein asks, "if the general concept of language dissolves in this way, doesn't philosophy dissolve as well? No, for the task of philosophy is not to create a new, ideal language, but to clarify the use of our language, the existing language. Its aim is to remove particular misunderstandings; not to produce a real understanding for the first time" (*PG*, 115). He keepsreminding us that there are no general theories in usages of words in language. Otherwise it would not permit for different possibilities for creating the unforeseeable and newer usages of language. Once we know how language works in our everyday life we can understand these possible variations. There are different kinds of language-games based on various forms of life. We cannot explain why the same word changes in meaning from one context to another. There would be no justification possible on this ground for seeking an essential definition of a word or its use and meaning. In philosophy, it is not a search for essential definition of a word, since words do not have unique function. It is because of influence of science we assume that a word has a unique function and its meaning emerges out of its essential relation with an object in the world for which it stands as proxy. This scientific assumption cannot be accepted within the realm of philosophy since language keeps on growing along with human activities or practices. Language contains all its various possible usages and the possibilities of finding the unforeseeable usages are already there in it. In a conversation he says,

> The wrong conception to which I want to object in this connection is the following, that we can come on something which today we cannot yet see, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and we have got it actually *present*; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for the future (*WVC*, 138).

Language as an autonomous entity is internally linked with human practices. It is incorrect to say that we create new language. In fact, language reveals its newer usages which evolve along with social practices.

Going by Wittgensteinian understanding, the world which is brought into our language-games is a matter of consensus among people at the normative level and is not about the physical and causal existence of the world. It is the language use which keeps creating a space for various possible worlds. In other sense, meaning of the world is outlined by the grammar of language usage. The matter of viewing the world as a shadow of logic or grammar is already highlighted by Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* where he writes, 'logic pervades the world' (*TLP*#5.61) and the limits of the language is the limits of the world (*TLP*#5.6). For us, everything in the world would be an affair of grammatical investigation. He emphasises that clarity on grammar of language would present to us a clear view of the world. Grammar is not a hidden, *a priori* structure underneath language. It is not independent of human activities and gets reconstituted in our everyday linguistic practices. Philosophy does not teach how to use the grammar. The grammar is not something we learn through teaching, explanation, and reflection; it is learned through our conventions and practices. We are required to look at the language and its use carefully where the grammar lies open to view. It does not need any explanations to grasp its use. One only got to observe it carefully. Description is what philosophers are supposed to do rather than offering explanations especially when we go for analyzing the nature and function of language in philosophy. Description can alone provide a clear view of grammar of the language which gives perspicuous representation of the reality. But our mistake is to look for an explanation when we approach the reality philosophically. The philosophical problems are not solved by giving new information but by arranging what we have already known (*PI*§109). This rearrangement of the familiar rules for the use of words into a perspicuous representation of grammar as part of our language helps to understand how the things are placed in the world. Philosophy merely describes how things are in the world but does not explain why they are so.

Philosophy as an activity is limited to clarification of language which includes grammatical investigation. The description of function and use of a word is to identify its grammar – the use of words in the language-game they belong to. It requires to see how the word is embedded in human actions, reactions, emotion, etc; its association with all of the expressions of human life. To put it precisely, description pertains to performing the game which language plays and to observe how language is practised in everyday life. Everything is kept open, nothing is hidden. Once we know how language works then misunderstandings about the grammar of our language can be avoided. As Wittgenstein suggests, don't think but look at how our language works in everyday life (*PI*§66).

From the above discussion, we conclude that in Wittgenstein's entire writings, language is seen as an activity – our way of living; describing the language means describing our life and activities. Wittgenstein intends, first, to show the limits of lan-

guage and philosophy and second, to demonstrate that there are no explanations required in resolving the philosophical problems. Such problems can only be dissolved because they are conceptual confusions arising out of the misunderstanding of logic or grammar of language. It can only be done by looking into and analysing the working of language. Once we know how language works in everyday life, the conceptual confusions do not occur in philosophy. Thus, the job of philosopher is limited only to look into the working of language and not tempering it by constructing any metaphysical doctrines. The central concern in Wittgenstein's work is the grammatical investigation which aims at resolving the philosophical problems by clarification of language. It is in this way, philosophy is therapeutic in curing the illness of intellect.

Abbreviations

TLP:*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*
PI: *PhilosophicalInvestigations*
BB: *The Blue and Brown Books*
WVC: *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*

PG: *Philosophical Grammar*

NOTES

1   Major representatives of classical Wittgensteinians are P.M.S. Hacker, G. E. M Anscombe, David Pears, and Peter Geach. For them, the *a priori* logical structure of language in the *Tractatus* gets replaced in Wittgenstein's later writings by the *a posterior* method of assigning meaning by looking into the working of language. This shift, for classical Wittgensteinians defines the divide between the early and the later Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's early model of the essential structure of language is particularly rejected in his later writings by expanding the role of language in its multiple usages.In classical Wittgensteinians term, the move is from essentialism of *Tractatus* to pluralism of *Philosophical Investigations*.

2   New Wittgesnteinians are represented by Cora Diamond, James Conant, Juliet Floyd, Alice Crary, Michael Kremer and Rupert Read. They hold that there is important continuity between his early and later writings. They do not agree with such radical interpretation of Wittgenstein's work. They object to these contrasting differences made between Wittgenstein's early and later works. They argue that the problems Wittgenstein is concerned with are same in both of his writings. Philosophy is seen as an activity. It is an activity of clarification of the working of language. Philosophy for Wittgenstein aims at bringing a live picture of the world

which primarily deals with social aspects of human life. They claim that Wittgenstein's later writings can be understood well only when seen in continuation with his early works.

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Are not the New Atheists Dogmatic?

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Abstract

Richard Dawkins (2006), Dennett (2006), Sam Harris (2004), Hitchens (2007) are some of the recent defenders of atheism. Their main argument in criticizing religion is that religion does not allow reason. They opine that religion is rigid, irrational and inflexible. The new atheists talk about religion as a whole that may include theistic beliefs and the social and cultural aspects of religious practices. Contrary to the opinion they hold, we claim that reason plays an important role in theism. If theism is dogmatic, then, there would not have been any scope for reasoning out the theistic ideas. But there were many attempts made to give scope for understanding God through reason. We bolster our position from three arguments. The first argument is from the religious scriptures. The second argument is from the advent and advance of natural theology. The third argument is from some prominent recent religious heads positions on accommodating scientific truths.

Keywords: faith; reason; religion; new atheists; dogmatism.

Introduction

The New Atheists include thinkers like Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and Christopher Hitchens. They criticize religious faith and religion. They hold that belief in God is irrational and socially unacceptable. Dawkins writes, 'Religion is a virus, indeed a type of mental illness' (Dawkins, 2006, p. 330). His central concern was whether religion is true. Dawkins suggests that religious belief is made less possible

by Darwinian science. He says that religion offers a poor image of the world. 'The universe presented by organized religion is a poky little medieval universe, and extremely limited' (Dawkins, 1996, p. 85). 'In contrast, science offers a bold and brilliant vision of the universe as grand, beautiful, and awe-inspiring' (McGrath, 2013). Dawkins states that religion avoids any human requirement to think. He remarks that science and reason prove their beliefs with evidence. On the other hand religious people stay away from facts and evidence. They live in an unreal world. Dawkins claims, 'faith is the great cop-out, the great excuse to evade the need to think and evaluate evidence' (McGrath, 2013, p. 84). For Dawkins, we should oppose all types of dogmatism grounded in faith. It is like that evil virus that infects human minds. According to him religious faith is inconsistent with the scientific method. He says religion leads to violence. And if we eliminate it, this will be the best thing for human life (McGrath, 2005). Along similar lines with Dawkins, Harris says, 'all reasonable men and women have a common enemy...our enemy is nothing other than faith itself' (Harris, 2004, p. 79). Regarding Sam Harris' work Silver writes, "Sam Harris' work addresses in detail the relationship between the culturally religious aspects of society – both as religious institutions and at the individual level – as compared to the growing non-belief movement" (Silver, 2013, p. 16). According to Harris, religious faith causes conflict in the world. 'Harris sees reason in a very unfavorable position in the battle against religion' (Jennek, 2017, p. 10). Harris states that instead of religion only science should answer most questions related to morality as well as conflict or violence (Jennek, 2017, p. 10). In short Harris regards religion as the main source of violence and hate. For Harris, there is an absence of rationalized 'interpretive method' (Silver, 2013, p. 16). This method may help people in reading, and most importantly socializing religious zones between the religious authority and followers. Harris describes religion as an outdated worldview. 'Harris suggests that scripture should be considered within more modern social and rational examinations as opposed to faith alone' (Silver, 2013, p. 17). Silver further writes, 'For Harris, religion has contrasting potential from being a social system of open-mindedness and acceptance to a potentially reactionary and aggressive conservative form of religiosity' (Silver, 2013, p. 16). Harris states that only those beliefs which can be observed and tested, should be regarded as real beliefs. Harris, in some cases, seems like suggesting the appointment of a pragmatic approach to scripture. He talks about the social welfare of society which will be determined from the usefulness of religion (Harris, 2004). Again, Hitchens explores some examples of how religion hampers the growth of human beings. He tries to look into all kinds of examples such as- historical, theological, and behavioral. Along with Christianity, Hitchens has come up with his adverse opinion on other religions like Islam and Hinduism, particularly posing ethical challenges to religion (Hitchens, 2007). While criticizing Hinduism, he mentions the existence of Hindu murderers and sadists and a form of Hindu suttee (Sati System) that

recommends 'suicide' of widows (Walker, 2007). Through these instances of religious practices, Hitchens claims that religion as such is bad, unwanted and troublesome (Hitchens, 2007). There is a general tendency among the new atheists to discard whatever ideas or thoughts that come out of religion. They think that religion as such is bad, unwanted as it is not rational and highly dogmatic. This attitude has made them to discard the entire episode of religion. Hitchens specifically talk about the social and cultural aspects of the effects of religion to claim that they are not only amoral but even immoral. In the book *God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything* he states that religion is absolutely immoral. According to him the original precepts are also faulty. These include a lot of things such as- presenting a false picture of the world to the innocent and the gullible, the doctrine of blood sacrifice, the doctrine of atonement, the doctrine of eternal reward and/or punishment, the imposition of impossible tasks and rules (Hitchens, 2007, p. 71). Another member of the atheists group Dennett argues that religious beliefs need scientific analysis so that its nature and future may be better understood. He denies the reasonableness of 'belief in God.' According to him the concept of God is too drastically undefined for the sentence 'God exists' to express a genuine proposition (Taylor, 2020). He wonders whether the believers of God actually do believe that God exists. "He thinks it more likely that they merely profess belief in God or 'believe in belie' in God" (Taylor, 2020). He thinks that according to the believers, belief in God is the right thing. Hence Dennett argues that no theistic belief is reasonable or rational (Dennett, 2006).

The new atheists' comment about religion may roughly be equated with what Geertz and Weber classify as 'traditional' religion. For them, religion can be classified as two different types: one is 'traditional,' and the other is 'rationalized.' The characteristic of 'rationalized' religion is abstract and logical as against 'traditional' religion (Wartono, 2012). For Geertz, in 'traditional' religion, there is a 'cluttered arsenal of myth and magic' to be used whenever disaster strikes; the rationalized religion is 'more abstract, more logically coherent, more generally phrased' (Geertz, 1973). But the new atheists do not subscribe to this distinction. They think that religion is dogmatic, inflexible, and rigid. What Weber and Geertz would have considered as rationalized religion might not be acceptable to the new atheists.

For instance, new atheist Harris has criticized the Abrahamic religions and wanted to eliminate Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. He is critical of belief in things for which there is no evidence, such as gods or deities. "Harris also argues that people who turn to violence because of religious reasons are not 'stupid' or uneducated; they suffer from something much more dangerous, namely, from faith" (Jennek, 2017, p. 19). Another atheist member Hitchens criticizes religion. He describes how religion is a human-made wish causing of dangerous sexual domination. Hitchens realizes that religion lacks justifications and offers no explanation of anything important (Hitchens, 2007).

Among the new atheists, Dawkins and Dennett focus on conflicts between science and religion, whereas Harris and Hitchens pay attention to the political, cultural, and psychological criticisms leveled against religion. Religion, though difficult to define, may be understood in two aspects: one is the discussions related to doctrinal aspects of religion, which generally can be brought under theology; the other is the practical and day-to-day affairs of religious practices that impact the moral, social, and cultural aspects of human life. The new atheists level criticisms against both these aspects of religion, though they do not make such distinctions. They target religion in its entirety. They use the same word religion to denote the theistic beliefs and the moral and cultural aspects of religion. However, we make a distinction within the new atheists' criticisms to exclude the moral, social, and cultural dimensions of religion from the theistic beliefs. In this article, we focus on their understanding of theism and argue that their understanding is wrong.

What is common in their criticism is that everyone talks about the absence of reason in theism. Dawkins claims that 'faith is blind trust without evidence and even against the evidence' (Taylor, 2020). He regards faith to be an evil element. He further states, 'it does not require justification and does not tolerate argument' (Taylor, 2020). According to the earlier view of Dawkins, faith is irrational whereas, in his latter description, he regards faith as evil, implying that it is at odds with rationality. By holding quite a similar view with Dawkins' earlier position, Harris calls religious faith as an 'unjustified belief in matters of ultimate concern.' (Taylor, 2020).

The atheists and their position have their critics. With respect to the atheists view on theism, the critics of atheists point out the absence of proof of the new atheists' position (Corlett, 2009) (Craig, 2007), impossibility of proving atheists position (McCormick, 2008) (Garvey, 2010), and possibility of proving God's existence (Markham, 2010). We bother about the new atheists' rigidity in holding on to their opinion with respect to their understanding of theism. They keep repeating that theism is irrational and inflexible as it is faith-based.

True, theism employs faith. But it doesn't mean there is no scope for reason or it doesn't mean reason was not employed in understanding God. Some schools of thought say there is no need of reason to understand religion and religious matters. 'Fideism' talks about faith in matters about religion. It is defined as a theory which argues that 'faith does not need the support of reason, and should not seek it' (Quinn & Taliaferro, 2000, p. 376) But even fideists are of different types, and all of them do not subscribe to faith without any reference to reason. While some fideists argue about faith without the need of reason (Quinn & Taliaferro, 2000) other fideists put emphasis on faith on the matters that go beyond reason (Carroll, 2008). So, even if we concede to the new

atheists' position that reason does not play a part in theism, we can at best say, that it refers to one group of believers. And even in that group, not all will be blind to reason.

Argument from religious scriptures

Religious scriptures are considered to be the source of theistic thought of the respective religions. And no scripture totally shuns reason. Scriptures of different religion do give some room for reason despite them being religious works. We quote a few passages from different religion to show that scriptural texts give place to reason, unlike the atheists' claims. The Bible, in Isaiah 1:18, says, ''Come now and let us reason together, saith the LORD' (Isaiah 1:18 KJV). Similarly, in James 3:17, the Bible says, 'But the wisdom from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, open to reason, full of mercy and good fruits, impartial and sincere' (James 3:17). In Islam, their Scripture Quran sanctions the use of reason. Suggesting the use of reason Quran says, 'Say: bring your proof if you are truthful' (Quran, Al-Baqarah - The Cow - 2:111 (Sura: 2, Verse: 111)). 'Surely the worst beasts in God's sight are those that are deaf and dumb and do not reason' (Quran, Al-Jalalayn) (8:22).

The advent and advance of natural theology

If there is no scope of reason in theism, then, why these scriptural texts should talk about reason and using reason in understanding God? We cannot expect a text on theism to talk about all issues only through reason. It may be talking about God's authority, His revelations, and the humans' affairs appealing to the faith of the believers. What we need to concern is if there is any scope for reason in these scriptures. We have to admit the answer is yes. We can claim the seed of having reason in religious context is sanctioned in the scriptures. Are the atheists going to deny this?

The seeds of reason as present in the scriptures were taken up and used by the theologians in understanding the divinity without reference to any of the scriptures. Theologians like Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas used reason to understand religion. Though according to these theologians, faith is more important than reason, they never denied reason. They try to prove God's existence through arguments. This suggests they give reason its due within the scope of religious understanding.

St. Thomas Aquinas articulates a classical position on the relation between reason and revelation.

There is a twofold mode of truth in what we profess about God. Some truths about God exceed all the ability of human reason. Such is the truth that God is triune. But there are some truths which the natural reason also is able to reach. Such are the truth that God exists, that he is one, and the like. In fact, such truths about God have

been proved demonstratively by the philosophers, guided by the light of natural reason (Aquinas, 1975).

According to Aquinas, reason and revelation help us knowing the truths about God. Some truths about God can be attained through human reasoning and some other truths through revelation. But both kinds of truths are important for our belief system. 'And even the truths that are knowable by reason, people may accept them on faith if they lack the time, opportunity, or ability to verify them for themselves' (Aquinas, 2007, p. 92).Aquinas claims that the use of reason can strengthen faith (Aquinas, 1993). Through this, we can understand that Aquinas, even though a medieval theologian, was never against reason. In fact, on practical grounds, he suggests that people can accept those things by faith when they do not have time to employ reason. And he further suggests that reason can strengthen faith.

The religious thinkers of those times no doubt have given importance to faith. But they did not deny reason. For instance, St. Anselm, the medieval theologian, was saying that to make sense out of the Christian message, one has to first embrace Christianity. He remarks that to be moved by the Holy Spirit, who will 'open the eyes' of the believer and bring about a greater understanding, one should have faith in the religion. However, Anselm was not a pure fideist. He developed the ontological argument, the only *apriori* argument among the traditional arguments to establish the existence of God.

Anselm remarks in the preface of his work *Proslogium (or Discourse on The Existence of God)* his intention to suspend his belief of the existence of God and to make an effort to demonstrate and establish the existence of God thus,

…I began to ask myself whether there might be found a single argument which would require no other for its proof than itself alone; and alone would suffice to demonstrate that God truly exists, and that there is a supreme good requiring nothing else, which all other things require for their existence and well being; and whatever we believe regarding the divine Being (Anselm, 1903).

Even the early modern thinkers did approve that theology is an exercise that is concerned with validating the existence of God without the help of scriptures and without banking on faith. For instance, Descartes says in his *Meditations* thus,

And, indeed, I have observed that you, with all the other theologians, not only affirmed the sufficiency of natural reason for the proof of the existence of God, but also, that it may be inferred from sacred Scripture, that the knowledge of God is much clearer than of many created things, and that it is really so easy of acquisition as to leave those who do not possess it blameworthy (Descartes, [1637] 1901).

As Descartes observes, they preferred to give faith equal or more importance than reason; still, they didn't want to reject reason. Their attempts and arguments prove they employed reason. Traditionally theists have proposed two broad types of arguments for God's existence: apriori arguments and aposteriori arguments. Both apriori and aposteriori arguments try to understand God's existence through reason and do not go for 'revealed' scriptural truths. Ontological arguments, teleological arguments, different versions of design arguments, cosmological arguments are the examples of how theologians try to justify rationally their beliefs. Apart from the arguments for the existence of God there are other religious doctrinal issues like the problem of evil, miracles and testimony, and religious experiences where theologians provide arguments and try justifying their points. We are not claiming that what those theologians said is right or their arguments are sound enough. But, at the same time, we cannot deny that they tried to understand through reason and arguments. We cannot belittle their efforts.

But the new atheists conveniently sidelined this entire group of natural theologians and their effort to prove the existence of God. We are not saying they gave a convincing proof for the existence of God. In fact, that is not the focus of this article. Rather, we want to point out that many theologians made serious attempts to prove God's existence through employing reason and without reference to any revealed scriptures. Natural theology rests on evidence. Natural theology 'is the program for inquiring by the light of natural reason alone into whatever truths of natural reason human beings might be able to find about God' (Brent, 2018).

In a sense, natural theology was making its attempt to 'prove' the existence of God, through natural reason. It didn't go into the question of the possibility of God's nonexistence; that is atheists' position. For the theologians, there were two possibilities: either they utilize natural theology, or if they fail in whatever way, they shall opt for revealed theology. That is the reason we find theologians who question the attempt of understanding of God by reason, go to the other position of accepting God through revelation and revealed scriptures.

We have seen that scriptures and theologians do allow and employ reason. The new atheists may think the 'reason' that theologians employed cannot be considered as reason. In their understanding reason is essentially tied to the evidence, which is obtained through sense experiences. But this position is not non-contentious. The rationalist school championed by philosophers like Rene Descartes does not believe in the certainty of knowledge obtained through sense experiences. He says, 'what we know a priori is certain, beyond even the slightest doubt, while what we believe, or even know, on the basis of sense experience is at least somewhat uncertain' (Descartes, [1628]1988). But

for the empiricist school of thought, reason, if at all any, should be based on sense experiences. John Locke says,

Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper void of all characters, without any ideas. How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I

While there is a difference between rationalist and empiricist understanding of the relationship between sense experience and reason for the certainty of knowledge, it needed an intervention from Immanuel Kant to show the importance of both, where he reconciled between empirical and rationalist tradition with his famous quote, 'Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind' (Kant, 1998, p. 50).

But new atheists seem to set aside Kantian reconciliation attempt. The new atheists favor the empiricist tradition. Hence, they insist on evidence and sense-experiences. For them, anything that is without evidence is irrational. As mentioned, Richard Dawkins states that 'faith is blind trust without evidence and even against the evidence' (Taylor, 2020). So, for them, faith in God's existence is irrational as it is without evidence. But empiricist position will not help in getting any useful knowledge. Empiricism is based on empirical evidence, and it is slippery. 'Those who place it at the centre of their epistemology tend to either give accounts that are too narrow to be realistic, or too underdescribed to do away with the slipperiness' (Garvey, 2010, p. 13).

While the new atheists try to show that there is no reasonable justification to believe in God's existence, they were not able to prove the nonexistence of God. And more importantly, they were never able to disprove God based on their understanding of evidence. This criticism was accepted by new atheists. Dawkins says, 'You can't prove a negative (so far so good). Science has no way to disprove the existence of a supreme being (this is strictly true)' (Garvey, 2010, p. 10). McCormick, therefore opines that the impossibility of proving the new atheists' position may even lead them to use faith to hold on to their position. And in that sense, science is as much a religious ideology as religion is (McCormick, 2008). But still, the new atheists take it as their task that they should not encourage people to hold on to faith. Dawkins says, 'I do everything in my power to warn people against faith itself' (Dawkins, 2006, p. 306). So, on one side, they are not in a position to prove the nonexistence of God. Still, they stick to that idea based on their faith. And they are hell-bent on asking people to shed their faith.

Even if we assume new atheists' position is right for argument's sake, we still cannot conclude that theists and religious believers are rigid and inflexible. Some of the prominent religious leaders have accepted the scientific discoveries and amended

their beliefs and religious principles. With their orthodoxy and a religious position that gives less scope for changes, still, some religious leaders try changing their position in the light of discoveries and inventions.

For instance, Pope Francis Bacon's comments were radical ones. Pope Francis said, 'The Bible is a holy beautiful book, but like all great and ancient works, some passages are outdated' (King, 2017). Pope John Paul II, in 1996 suggested evolution was more than a hypothesis and effectively proven fact. Pope Francis has stated the theories of evolution, and Big Bang are real, and God is not 'a magician with a magic wand' (Withnall, 2014). At the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, Pope made comments that question the theories of creationism and intelligent design (Withnall, 2014). Pope Francis again at one place commented that 'There is no hellfire; Adam and Eve are not real' (Tiko14, 2015).

Religious commitment

While the focus of critics was on epistemological, ontological, and metaphysical issues, we focus on the ethical issue. And to strengthen our position we want to bring the point of religious commitment. Robert Audi outlines the normative notions especially the notions of rationality, justification, and reasonableness for evaluating the rationality of religious commitments (Audi, 2011). Audi presents four distinct ideals for the normative assessment of religious commitment in relation to reason as that notion is understood in discussions of faith and reason. Those are- first, the rationality of such a commitment, second, its justification, third, its reasonableness, and fourth, the extent to which it reflects knowledge. And according to Audi only knowledge is related to faith. By relating it with faith knowledge opposes the other three notions (Audi, 2011, p. 43).

According to Audi faith and reason are often viewed as rivals (Audi, 1991). The opposition is often seen as a problem between religion and science. He argues that different though they are, faith and reason need not be put on opposing sides in human life (Audi, 1991, p. 213). So he explores 'the possibility that faith, as a central element in religious commitment, can be rational even if theistic beliefs with the same content should turn out not to be' (Audi, 1991, p. 213). Audi talks about three dimensions of Rationality in Religious Commitment. They are- Ontological, semantic and epistemological. The ontological dimension- the traditional view holding that: God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent; the semantic dimension- is closely related to the ontological one. 'The most notable contrast here is between cognitivism and non-cognitivism: the former maintains, and the latter denies, that sentences about God express propositions, hence truths or falsehoods as opposed to, say, spiritual attitudes or symbolic pictures' (Audi, 1991, p. 214) Third, there is the epistemic dimension-'the kind of attitude with which we hold it and the sorts of grounds appropriate to that

attitude (Audi, 1991, p. 214). Audi says- 'In the domain of cognitive religious commitment, there is not only the possibility of knowledge or justified belief regarding God, but of faith and hope' (Audi, 1991, p. 214).

How might the religious people's faith, and indeed their overall religious commitment, be rational? While dealing with this question he proposes to concentrate on non-doxastic faith which doesn't embody belief of its propositional object. His exact words are-

As I conceive non- doxastic faith, say faith that God loves us, it is quite compatible with a kind of religious conviction, in the sense of that phrase illustrated by 'people of religious conviction'. Religious conviction as a general cognitive attitude or set of such attitudes is a matter of such things as the strength of one's faith, the depth of one's resolution to try to quell doubts one may have about God's love and goodness, and the extent of one's determination to make one's religious outlook central in one's life.The non-doxastic character of the faith does not in the least prevent it from being strong both in the extent to which it pervades the person's life and in its resistance to being forgotten or given up too readily upon discovery of counterevidence (Audi, 1991, p. 223)

Audi was never a supporter of evidentialist. He states that evidentialist might ask for evidence for non-doxastic faith. Though theists may try to disprove evidentialism for all the cognitive religious attitudes yet the rationality of religious commitment does not require doing so. Audi claims that 'evidential considerations are insufficient to justify theistic belief' (Audi, 1991, p. 224). He further states that 'The non-doxastic view contrasts with non-cognitivism, which takes religious utterances to be expressive of attitudes and feelings, but not semantically statemental in a sense implying truth or falsity' (Audi, 1991, p. 225). To him, 'one can choose, and retain, one's religious commitment more freely when its rational grounds are less obvious and do not seem evidentially compelling' (Audi, 1991, p. 229). Oher than the warranty of religious faith, he argues how religious commitment primarily involves an ethical element. Quoting Audi as follows-

… a rational person normally has moral grounds for ethical conduct, grounds that are evidentially justificationally) independent of theistic commitments. Usually, these are themselves sufficient to warrant the relevant moral acts, in this case the altruistic and just actions. Indeed, even if this justificational overdetermination did not hold, rational persons should make some effort to find all the available major justifying grounds for important kinds of conduct they engage in. This not only yields better justified conduct; it helps one both to understand one's obligations and to fulfill them. It clarifies precisely what one should on balance do; it often provides a sense of why one should do it; and it strengthens one's motivation to do it. Similar points hold in the aesthetic case. A cathedral

built as a beautiful monument to God can also be so constructed as to serve secular needs sufficiently pressing to justify such a construction in their own right; and a rational builder will certainly try to make it safe enough to avoid crushing the huddled families who will take shelter there during storms. To be sure, the demands of beauty and utility can conflict, and a rational religious person can then face agonizing conflicts. But faith is no worse off than belief in such conflicts. Indeed, one lesson of history is that if one does not regard one's theistic beliefs and other religious beliefs as infallible or unassailably justified, one has a better chance of reconciling them with secular reasons that tend in a different direction (Audi, 1991, p. 233).

Audi focuses on the cognitive side of religious commitment. According to him there exists a kind of faith which is psychologically strong as well as evidentially modest to be rational. For him 'a religious commitment affects moral and interpersonal conduct, as well as attitudes toward the universe and toward human existence within it. The rationality of this commitment does not reduce to that of religious belief or of any other religious attitude, alone' (Audi, 1991, p. 234). Thus, he shows that rational religious commitment reconciles faith and reason.

The dogmatism of the new atheists

Are not these instances examples of religious leaders ready to change their stance? Are the new atheists going to point them and the religious thinkers dogmatic still? If we think that dogmatism rests on the principle of turning oneself against the available evidence and still claiming to be what they said is right, then the new atheists are adept in doing that. First, let us see what dogmatism means. Dogmatism is 'a relatively closed cognitive organization of beliefs about reality focused around a central set of beliefs about absolute authority which, in turn, provides a framework for patterns of intolerance and qualified tolerance toward others' (Rokeach, 1954, p. 195). 'Those who are open to new information are considered to be low in dogmatism, and those who are typically more closed-minded are higher in dogmatism' (Brown, 2012).

We have seen that religious thinkers had a tough challenge to take, unlike the new atheists. They have to go against their religious belief by suspending the authority of revealed scriptures, which for them are the words of God. In a sense, they bracketed out the scriptural revelation, to accommodate reason in understanding God. They made an earnest attempt in doing so, thanks to the provision available in scriptures that they can reason out what God said. Their contours are limited, and still, they reasoned out on religious claims. As pointed out, some of the popes have accepted scientific results even if it is against the scriptural revelations. Despite all these shreds of evidence, the new atheist claim theology is rigid, irrational, and inflexible.

New atheists are trying to state there is no presence of reason in theology. The earlier atheists would not have spent so much time and effort on criticizing such things where people claim something without any reason. Even the new atheists spent time and argue, trying to disprove God's existence (Dawkins, 2006). This again proves that theologians were trying to argue for God through reason. Theologians are also thinkers. They also apply reason, and with the help of arguments, they try to establish their conclusion. In spite of all these efforts, still, the new atheists say that they do not consider theology as a subject at all (Dawkins, 2006).

For the progress of knowledge, everyone (including scientists and atheist thinkers) had to rely on earlier thinkers. And there are examples where most of them have acknowledged the work of early thinkers. Modern thinkers have been following the idea of previous thinkers. Philosophers have acknowledged the contributions of theologians in shaping their thought and are ready to accept that their thought has its similarity with the earlier thinkers' ideas. For instance, Wittgenstein scholar Anthony Kenny expresses his credit to Aquinas. He mentions that Aquinas is 'one of the dozen greatest philosophers of the western world' (Davies, 2002, p. 4). Descartes and Leibniz are indebted to pay their respects to Aquinas (Davies, 2002).

In the 17th century, Descartes was unaware that over ten centuries before St. Augustine had made the same point (about 'Cogito, ergo sum'). Descartes' friends let him know about the work of St. Augustine. In a letter Descartes writes in November 1640 from Leiden in the Netherlands, he says:

I am obliged to you for bringing to my notice the passage of St. Augustine to which my Cogito ergo sum has some relation. I have been to the town library to read it; he does, I find, really use it to prove the certainty of our existence (Bennett, 2017).

In another letter from Leiden, May 2, 1644, to 'Father Mesland,' he says:

I am much obliged to you for telling me of the passages in St. Augustine that may serve to give authority to my opinions; some of my other friends have already done this; and I am exceedingly gratified that my thought is in agreement with such a holy and distinguished personage (Bennett, 2017).

Conclusion

Not only were philosophers influenced by early thinkers and their philosophical ideas, but scientists as well owe their debt to earlier thinkers and philosophers. The new atheists stand on the shoulders of the earlier thinkers, theologians, and philosophers. The new atheists are free to accept their conclusions or reject them. But they cannot

make a claim there is no effort from religious people to employ reason in understanding religious doctrines. If they still uphold that religion is rigid, irrational, and inflexible, can't we accuse them of these same accusations? If this is their stand, are not they dogmatic?

The new atheists have been quite critical about religion. Their criticisms are not just confined to religious doctrines, and unavailability of reason in theism. They also extend their criticisms against all aspects of religion that may include social and cultural aspects. They come up with allegations against the religious practices and rituals that have moral implications. For instance, Harris and Hitchens level scathing attacks on the social and cultural practices that arise out of religion, and they also talk about the moral and ethical implications of following those practices. For instance, their criticism leveled against Islam as terror-prone and their comments about Hindu social practices like Sati and lotted many other criticisms leveled against other religions like Christianity, all these demands serious reflections. Future research may focus on these issues. It may pay attention to the social and ethical implications of these criticisms. The new atheists target religion in its entirety. Here, we have attempted to show through this article the new atheists' dogmatic attitude in understanding theism.

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A Critique of R. M. Hare – Philippa Foot Debate

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Abstract

The 'is- ought' problem is a philosophical one how to lead 'what ought to be' from 'what is'. This problem is being considered since Aristotle's philosophy but it has reached at climax in modern moral philosophy. This article is written for illuminating the stiff 'is/ ought' debate between R. M. Hare and Philippa Foot under the sections 'no ought from is', 'ought from is' and 'critical analysis of Foot's neo-naturalism'. First we proceed with the notion that ought judgment cannot be derived from factual proposition which is presented in the first section of article mostly in the reference of R. M. Hare. Second issue of this article is based on the idea of Philippa Foot that value judgments are logically related with the fact of world. The last issue of the paper is concerned with critical analysis of Philippa Foot's neo- naturalism. The paper concludes that although Hare's arguments are more sophisticated than that of Foot, the major problem of his theory was that he left limited scope for moral language by merely reducing to its prescriptive function.

Keywords: Is and Ought controversy, Neo-naturalism, Critique, Prescriptivism.

Introduction:

The central problem of meta-ethics is concerned with 'is' and 'ought' question. The moot issue is:can moral judgmentsbe derived from factual propositions? This is a problem which is not merely conceived by R. M. Hare and Philippa Foot but in ancient moral philosophy by Aristotlein *Nicomachean Ethics*[1]. R. M. Hare proposes that there is no necessary and private connection between moral judgment and factual statement in hiswell known book*The Language of Morals*[2], *Freedom and Reason*[3] and *Moral*

Thinking[4]and in his article "Descriptivism" which was published in *The Is and Ought Question*[5] edited by W. D. Hudson. On the other hand, neo-naturalistic philosopher Philippa Foot expounds that moral judgmentslogically*entail* factual statements. She reconciles her doctrine in "Moral Beliefs"[6]and "Goodness and Choice".[7]It is well known that R. M. Hare was not the first philosopher who refuted the notion of Philippa Foot regarding the 'Is' and 'Ought' question but also before him G. E. Moore had contradicted the derivation of *ought* from *is* targeting naturalism in his work *Principia Ethica*by saying that the attempt of defining moral term such as 'good'amounts to *naturalistic fallacy*.[8]

Above problem may be inquired in two parts,namely, 'no *ought* from *is*' and '*ought* from *is*'.

I. No 'Ought' from 'Is'

R. M. Hare accepts in his article "Descriptivism" that he was acquainted with the term *descriptivism* through J. L. Austin's account on 'descriptive fallacy'.[9] J. L. Austin had propounded in his book *How to Do Things with Words* about 'descriptive fallacy' that some utterances are used to be descriptive when they are not.[10] Hare says that "I agree with him that the word might mislead, it will serve."[11]After that he argued thata similar problem was created in the writings of naturalistic philosopher while defining moral judgments in the term of factual ones. Furthermore, the neo-naturalistswho accept that what *ought* to be done can be logically derived from propositions that are purely statement of facts, commit the same mistake. Therefore, Hare proposes in his above article:

"Philosophical mistakes are like dandelions in the garden; however carefully one eradicates them there are sure to be some more next year, and it is difficult to think of novel ways of getting rid of their familiar faces."[12]

Hare solves all over the problem inspired by the notions of David Hume and ancient moral philosopher Aristotle. David Hume was the first philosopher whoaccepted that moral distinctions are not derived from reason. In his book *A Treatise of Human Nature*, he says that "morals have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be derived from reason; and that because reason alone can never have any such influence. Moral excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly important in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason."[13]Again, like this argument, Aristotle accepts in *Nicomachean Ethics* that, to say something is good is to guide action, cannot be merely stating a fact about the world.[14]Impressed by these ideas, Hare presents three concepts:

1. Moral judgments are nothing more than *prescriptions* of actions. According to

him, prescription is not correlated with true and false but with how they can be applied universally.

2. Moral judgments are evaluated by concerning the facts of world, but the facts do not of necessity entail moral judgments.

3. Moral judgments do not of necessity entail factual propositions because it is governed by universal desire and requirements.

Notably, Harenot only followed David Hume and Aristotle in this regard, he wasalso impressed with G. E. Moore. As we know that the notion of *no*'ought' (value words) from 'is' (natural facts)was established in 20[th]century by non-naturalistic philosopher G.E. Moore by eradicating the concept of naturalism. In the first chapter of his book *Principia Ethica,* he accepted that "If I am asked "what is good?" my answer is that good is good and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked "how is good to be defined?" my answer is that it cannot be defined and that is all I have to say about it."[15] It means that he does not assent that moral term can be defined in the factual term or moral judgments can be deduced by factual one. That is whyhe rebuts the disquisition of naturalistic philosopher that 'good' is pleasure. He says that if 'good' means pleasant, it may be said that 'what is pleasure isgood' which would be merely a tautology. Therefore 'good' doesn't mean 'pleasant'. By refuting the thesis of naturalism, he confers the arguments by saying: "My point is that "good" is a simple notion, just as "yellow" is a simple notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to anyone who does not already knew it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is…you can give a definition of horse, because a horse has many different properties and qualities."[16] In other words, he meant that the term 'good' is simple and non-natural, so it is not conducive to factual proposition. If we try to define it in factual terms, we commit the *naturalistic fallacy*. However the problem is why does Hare think that though moral judgments are prescriptive in nature not factual, these judgments entail both prescriptive and descriptive meaning? His elucidationfollows.

Factual Statement and Imperative/ Prescriptive

Hare believes that moral judgments are prescriptive essentially and descriptive secondarily. He conceives in *The Language of Morals* that moral judgments guide action and choice because they are mainly prescriptive and then again in*Freedom and Reason* he proves that "If moral judgements were not prescriptive, there would be no problem about moral weakness; but there is a problem; therefore they are prescriptive"[17]. According to Hare, a person who is morally weak does not work according his statement that he ought to do. But moral judgments are not irrational because when it prescribes something, they depend on the some logical arguments which is the description of any

fact or case, for example,if anyone says "you ought to pay your tailor's bill" then you can legitimately ask the reason and the speaker will present some description of fact that "your tailor has prepared a suit for you." Therefore Hare says *Neustic* depends on the *Phrastic*. Both italic terms are derived from Greek words where *phrastic* means 'to indicate' and *neustic* means 'to nod something'. It means that when any prescription is delivered by moral judgments (value judgments) then the acceptance of it rely on its descriptions. That is why Hare accepts that value judgments ('good', 'right', 'ought') have supervenientcharacter.

But Hare accepts that value judgments cannot be completely reduced to factual statements, because it *entails* mostly the element of *imperative* in it. Therefore he states in his book *The Language of Morals* that "The function of moral principles is to guide conduct. The language of moral is one sort of prescriptive language. And this is what makes ethics worth studying; for the question 'what shall I do?' is one that we cannot for long evade."[18] In other words, it may be said that due to some elements of imperatives, moral judgments cannot be completely descriptive one. And it is noticeable also that descriptive meaning is secondary meaning of moral judgment which support only as an argument. In this regards, he propounds two types of justification rules in his well known book *The Language of Morals*. The rules are:

1."No indicative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premises which cannot be validly drawn from the indicatives among them alone.

2.No imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premises which does not contain at least one imperative."[19]

With the help of these rules, Hare concludes that no moral judgment can purely be a statement of fact. Now, it is noticeable that same notion was accepted by A.J.Ayer and C. L. Stevenson. But Hare thinks that ought-value judgments can be logically deduced in prescriptions for they are used in action guiding.

Imperative/ Prescriptive and Ought-Statement

We can clarify the concept of Hare that moral judgments are prescriptive by his definition that ought value judgments entail imperatives. He says that ought-statements cannot be used evaluatively unless it does not follow imperative sense. He believes that if anyone accepts that ought-value judgments are prescriptive which are action-guiding then he has to accept that they entail imperative. In this regards, in his book *The Language of Morals* he declares that **"To guide choices or actions, a moral judgement has to be such that if a person assents to it, he must assent to some imperative sentence derivable from it; in other words, if a person does not assent to some such imperative sentence,…he must have misunderstood the moral judgement"**.[20]Hare accepts in *Freedom and Reason*

two conditions for assenting value judgments as an imperative one: (1) Sincerity and, (2) Ability. Hare says that if speaker is sincere and understands the meaning of ought-value judgment which he assents "I ought to do X" and in spite of it, he is physically and psychologically able to act according to value judgment then will accept to the command "Let me do X". According to Hare, if speaker is not assenting value judgments as a command then either he is insincere or incapable to understand the original meaning of value judgments which are imperative. And again it may be also that he is physically and psychologically weak. In the same book,he says that "If a man does what he says he ought not to, though perfectly able to resist the temptation to do it, then there is something wrong with what he says, as well as with what he does. In the simplest case it is insincerity; he is not saying what he really thinks. In other cases it is self-deception; he thinks that he ought, but he has escaped his own notice using 'ought' in an off-colour way".[21]

Now a question is raised that when value judgments entail command then is it connected with merely second person 'you' or everyone? This point of view will be stated under the following heading.

Ought Statement and Universal Prescription

In this regards, Hare clarifies that when he talks about prescription which is reduced by ought-value judgments in moral sense, is not only related with second person 'you' but they are universal.According to Hare, moral/ought-judgments are universal just because of its descriptive meaning which present some argument and reason to make moral judgments as a universal one. For example, when we say a person "you ought not to smoke in this compartment", he has the right to know the reason behind this judgment and there may be some reason such as either there may be some children in the compartment or maybe there is a notice against smoking in that compartment. If he knows the reason then he goes to another compartment for smoking and if there too condition is like before then same ought-judgment will be applied there as well. In this way, the characteristic such as prescription and universalization (description) of moral judgments make it rational.

Hare's concept of universalization is based on three conditions: (1) fact (2) imagination (3)inclination/desire. According to Hare, the three conditions are necessary to make any ought judgments universal. Therefore he assumes thatfirst of all,we should notice what the factis behind moral prescription and what might be its consequence, and what is the circumstance in which ought judgment has been delivered to other.Again, we should imagine ourselves in the place of another personand ask whether we accept the same judgment for ourselves in thesame circumstance as the other person is now. In this hypothetical situation, we not only take over other's external circumstances but also his psychological belief, emotion, desire and inclination. We should try to imagine

what would be my reaction if I were in the place of other. We should not prescribe any judgment for other which we do not prefer for us.Again, we should prescribe the judgments which satisfythe preferences of more people, for example, a teacher has been agreed to take an extra class in coming Sunday. On Sunday, every student is presentexcept the teacher. Suppose that students dislike waiting for a long time. That is why someone calls the teacher but he wants to come after watching news. This conflicting issue should be decided by balancing the preferences of teacher and the students, because the strength of student's *preference* is greater than teacher's own,therefore, under this circumstance,we should prescribe that he (teacher) should *not* watch news.

Actually, Hare was the supporter of *preference utilitarianism.* According to this principle, an action is good which gives greater benefit and satisfies the preferences (desires) of more people. It is important to note that traditionalutilitarianism is different from preference utilitarianism for according to traditional utilitarianism, an action is right which satisfiesthe happiness of maximum peoplewhereaspreference utilitarianism says that an action is right which maximize more preferences. The main reason for calling Hare as preference utilitarian is that according to him, we should prescribe the judgments to others that satisfy the preferences of maximum people. For example, 'the teacher should not watch news', this prescription satisfies the preferences of all students rather than the teacher, therefore it ought to be performed, and thereby the action is right.

Hare accepts two level of moral thinking for deciding which action is right: (a) intuitive level (b) critical level.According to first level, an action is right which is according to general *prima facie*principles. At this level, people use moral intuitions or general *prima facie* principles in personal moral situations which they learn by mixing with otherpeople such as by mixing incollege and society or during upbringing or by past experiences. Hare classifies this class of people as Proles who apply intuitions in personal moral situations, for example, 'Do not tell a lie', 'Help others', and 'Do not break a promise' etc. But there is a problem for applying this intuition in a new moral situation, such as, a person who breaks the promise should be hanged or not? For solving this type of moral situation, Hare applies critical level of moral thinking. According to it, an action is good which maximize the preferences of more people. In this second level, a person applies his own critical thinking in any moral conflict and prescribes the judgment which is parallel to preferences of other. This type of moral thinking is used by Archangel who uses his own critical thinking in moral conflict.Hare remarks that "Intuitive moral thinking cannot be self-supporting, whereas critical thinking can be and is, the latter is epistemologically prior.*If* we were archangels, we could by critical thinking alone decide what we ought to do on each occasion; on the other hand, if we were proles, we could not do this, at least beyond the possibility of

question, by intuitive thinking." [22]

It is tacitly understood that Hare being the supporter of preference utilitarianism counts it as the foundation of universalization of ought-value judgments.Evidently,Hare says thatought-value judgments derive imperatives logically which are universal and depend on facts but facts are only secondarily important.

Noticeably,contrary to the above notion of Hare, neo-naturalistic philosophers think that there is no gapping between evaluative and descriptive terms. A. C. MacIntyre, G. Hunter, John Searle, Philippa Foot and P. T. Geach follow this argument.[23]Now I come to analyze derivation of 'ought' from 'is' with reference to Philippa Foot and not any other neo-naturalistic philosopher.However, I shall turn to Hare's critique of Foot's Neo-naturalism at a proper place.

II. 'Ought' from 'Is'

We are well familiar that Philippa Foot's position is completely different from Hare's position with regard to the problem whether evaluation can be deduced from description. We have seen that Hare had presented a negative point that the evaluative cannot be deduced from the descriptive.But now we will see that Foot approaches this problem in an assertive way. In this sense Foot accepts the notions as below:

1. Moral judgments are not merely prescriptions of actions but *evaluative* one.Evaluative conclusions have logical connection with factual propositions which is served as *evidence* to support the moral conclusion.

2. The goodness of things depends on certain criteria not on the choice of those things.

Evaluation and Description

Referring to thefirst observation, Foot says in her article "Moral Beliefs",non-descriptivists such as C. L. Stevenson and R. M. Hare accept that "an evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. Due to this reason that one man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence at all, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of "good" which connects it with one piece of "evidence" rather than another."[24]But Footclaims that if we accept the above notion of non-descriptivists that moral judgments are not related necessarily with factual statements, anyone can get moral conclusion from quite idiosyncratic premises; for example, he can say that the man is a good manbecause he clasps and unclasps his hands. According to Foot, everyone knows that no one can derive this evaluative conclusion such as 'he is a good man' from

this descriptive premise 'he clasps and unclasps his hands'.Further, she holds that there are two assumptions (whom she thinks false assumption)with the help of whichnon-descriptivists think that there is a logical gap between evaluation and description which are following:

"Assumption (1) is that some individual may, without logical error, base his beliefs about matters of value entirely on premises which no one else would recognize as giving any evidence at all. Assumption (2) is that, given the kind of statement which other people regard as evidence for an evaluative conclusion, he may refuse to draw the conclusion because this does not count as evidence for him."[25]

With regard to the assumption (1), the most important question is that whether the meaning of the word 'good' is *externally* or *internally* related to its fact. The follower of first assumption remarks that the relation is external. On this point of view, according to Foot,a moral eccentric can describe arbitrarily the clasping of hands as the action of a good man. That is why, Foot remarks that the evaluative meaning of good is internally related to its objects.She argues that we cannot say arbitrarily that anything is 'good' or 'bad' because goodness and rightness of anything depends upon some important characteristic of the thing therefore the relation between both (goodness of thing and characteristic of this thing) have necessary and logical relation. For example,no one can accept the belief that 'something is dangerous' unless hesupposes that it threatens a particular kind of serious evil such as injury or death, likewise one cannot logically hold the moral belief that 'something is good' unless the action is supposed to be connected with human good and harm. An example has been given by Foot that we cannot say that 'a man is good' because he lived for a thousand years because the statement 'he lived for a thousand years' is not connected with human good and harm.

Now, we turn to the assumption (2), according to it, a man might always refuse to accept the conclusion of an argument about values because what counted as evidence for other people did not count for him. The defender of second assumption accepts that there is a gap between facts and values because an action can be called 'good' and 'bad' both by different people with the help of the same fact or evidence. For example, Democracy can be called 'good' and 'bad' both by different people with the support of the same fact that it (democracy) is a form of government in which the people have the authority to choose their governing legislation. But Foot claims that the argument, which is given in the favor of second assumption, is not right and satisfactory because she remarks that there is no logical gap between facts and values.She clarifies it with an example: injury is necessarily bad, therefore everyone want to avoid it. Now, it is clear that the fact 'injury is bad' derives this evaluative conclusion 'we should avoid this'.

With the help of both assumptions, Foot asserts that every moral judgmentis

connected necessarily with some special facts.Now, I will discuss about the criteria of choice regarding to moral judgments.

Criteria of Choice

In the context of the secondobservation, Foot confers in her paper "Goodness and Choice" that choosing of things merely is not a sufficient condition for calling the things'good'. She remarks that there are three reasons why prescriptivists think that there is logical connection between calling things good and choosing them.These are following:

1. Value terms 'good' and 'right' are different from descriptive terms such as 'yellow' and 'square'.

2. The function of value judgments is to guide the conduct not to inform somethingwhich is performed by descriptive statements.

3. 'Good' can have the same meaning when applied to many diverse things. The main reason of it is the desire of choice.

But Foot contradicts this hypothesisthat there is logical connection between calling things good and choosing thembecause according to her, it is possible that we choose something and it is not 'good', likewise it is also possible that something is 'good' and we do not choose it. In this respect, she remarks that "I can speak of someone else as having the virtue of courage, and of course recognize it as a virtue in the proper sense, while knowing that I am a complete coward, and making no resolution to reform."[26]In this way, Foot accepts that the goodness of things is not based on the choice of speaker but on the some certain criteria of things. According to her,the criterion of saying that 'something is good' is determined bythe function and use of things, therefore no one can change it by his choice. In this regard,she asks a question in "Goodness and Choice" that the choice of speaker can ever be *sufficient* condition for use of the word 'good'? In this respect, she responses that "No one, I think, would try to maintain such a view quite generally; It is certain that the expression "a good knife"; cannot always be used in this way. For instance, the man who uses these words correctly must use them in conjunction with particular criteria of goodness, and the primary criterion of goodness in a knife is its ability to cut well."[27]In this way, we can say that the primary condition for calling something is'good', isbased on some particular criterion of it which cannot be determined by the choice of speaker. Like this, a pen may be called 'good'which has a particular criterion of goodness like clear and well writing capacity. Not only in non-moral sense but also in moral sense, the goodness of things is

determined by some certain criterion of these things not arbitrarily by virtueof the choice of speaker.This idea has been clarifiedin Foot's work "Moral Beliefs".Therefore Foot was against with the notion of Harethat *choice* of things is a sufficient condition for the use of the word 'good'.

However,Hare addresses very well all of the problems in his paper "Descriptivism"which were raised by Foot against his theory.

III. Critical Analysis of Foot's Neo-naturalism

Hare believes that the objections of Foot were baseless against him. After reading "Goodness and Choice", he says in his paper "Descriptivism" that "when I first read the article, as if, when she was constructing these arguments, she had the purpose of attacking a position which I, at any rate, have never defended, and with which, therefore, I need not concern myself."[28]

In the above context, it may be understood that the statement of Foot that Hare thinks about merely 'choice of speaker' is a sufficient condition for the use of the word 'good' is groundless. For, he accepts that if anyone says that 'so and so is a good thing' does not mean that he even chooses this thing. But according to him, in the place of it, if anyone says that I accept that 'so and so is a good thing' then it may be hoped that he wants to choose this thing. And whenever time will come he will act according to it. Therefore we can say that Hare accepts the connection between the use of goodness of anything and choice of it by the speaker in this second reference merely.

Like this, he again offers a reasonable response to the objection of Foot about the logical relation between evaluative and descriptive propositions. We have noticed in its previous part that Foot accepts some special pattern and criterion for established logical relation between the goodness of things and the characteristic of the things whereshe says that there is no logical connection between 'the man is a good man'and 'he clasps and unclasps his hands.' Hare states that Foot had no knowledge how to use'logical relation' between two sentences.In this respect,Hare explains that "by "logical connection" I mean that the *meaning* of the expressions is somehow linked"[29] with statement in literal sense. In this way, when anyone says that 'he is a good man because of clasping and unclasping his hand' is logically permissible but empiricallywe find it appears as a *reductio ad absurdum*.[30]In other words, both sentences such as 'he is a good man' and 'he clasps and unclasps his hands' are logically true and permissible because the meaning of both sentences is clear and understandable what speaker is saying the statement. But empirically his (speaker's) above statement is not right because according to Hare, we know from our experience that an action is goodif we have a pro-

attitude towardsit and which fulfill our desires and requirements. And this characteristic is not present in above instance to call it 'good action' empirically.Therefore the conception of Foot that we cannot logically derive 'he is good man' from 'he clasps and unclasps his hand'was wrong. Now it is clear that Foot was unaware about *logical relations* between two sentences,for that matter Foot'scritique in relation to prescriptivism which is presented under the heading of 'evaluation' and 'description' depended on erroneousfoundation.

With the above conceptions of Hare, we should not consider that he conceives a yawning gap between evaluative and descriptive meaning of any term as Footthinks about him. He says that "the descriptive and evaluative meaning of a term in a below context may be tied to it with varying degrees of tightness".[31]According to him, if we have no descriptive meaning such as sweet, juicy, red and large and a few more, it will be impossible to evaluate the expression: 'good strawberry'. As we know that he did not accept that value judgment can purely be deduced from factual premises because he accepts that most part of value judgments entail prescriptive one.

In this way, all objections of Foot against the doctrine of Hare were baseless.

Conclusion

Finally, it may be said that Hare and Foot both tried to present the proof that there is a logical way to rationally justify the moral judgments but their conclusion were different because Hare accepts that value-judgments are necessarily connected with imperative judgments whenever in the secondary level with description but Foot accepts that evaluative judgments are necessarily connected with factual judgments because the goodness of things depends upon some factual characteristics of the things.But Hare's form of non-descriptivism that evaluative judgments are not necessarily connected with factual statements, is more sophisticated and convincing than Foot. Because we know that both statements (evaluative judgments and factual statements) are different in nature; evaluative judgments such as 'honesty is good' are prescriptive which function is to guide conduct that is why these judgments are not neutral in the view of conduct whenever factual statements such as 'the earth is round' are informative only that is why these statements are neutral in the view of conduct. Due to this difference, value judgments cannot be necessarily deduced from factual statements only. Therefore Hare says that if we want to derive value judgment as a conclusion from factual statement, we should accept moral judgment as a major premise and factual statement as a minor premise. Likewise P. H. Nowell-Smith comments on the notion of R. C. Mortimer in the footnote of third chapter of *Ethics*that if we did not accept as a major premise 'we ought to obey our creator', we cannot assume this inference 'God created us, therefore

we ought to obey him'.[32]But Hare's position cannot be considered totally satisfactory.The moral judgments which are considered impossible to deduce from pure factual ones, according to him, is merely prescriptive.Nowell-Smith criticizes this notion and accepts that moral judgments are not only prescriptive but also perform different type of work. The meaning of a word is based on how it is used.Therefore his theory is called *multifunctional theory*.[33] G. J. Warnock for example, argues that moral words have dozens of works.[34]

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Social Change and Human Cycles: Philosophical Perspective of Sri Aurobindo

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Abstract

Philosophy plays a vital role in bringing out the conceptual clarification in any domain of thought. Social philosophy may be an organization of facts and values of social development.Sri Aurobindo's social philosophy is constructed on the integral data of Reality. Integral data is that the data of all the terms of being, matter, life, mind, psyche and self. How does it help us in understanding the significance of social development, particularly in the context of Sri Aurobindo's idea? The question is very important because Sri Aurobindo's idea of social development has been loaded with so much of conceptual hurdles that it is very difficult to comprehend whether his theory can stand the acid test of the time. He imagined an international society grounded on the relationship between matter and spirit, Indian heritage and culture. He welcomes an age of Supermind where the realization of good freedom and unity will predominate in all social groups. The object of this paper is to highlight Sri Aurobindo's concept of social change and how it is related to human cycles, which is different from other Indian and Western philosophers.

Keywords: The Absolute, Integral knowledge, Spiritual Evolution, Symbolic Society, Subjective Trend.

Introduction

Sri Aurobindo was an eminent thinker in the contemporary period of Indian Philosophy. In the way of his life one can plainly see two distinct periods, when he was keenly involved in politics and later on when he removed from his life and spent the rest of his time in meditation, reflecting on various aspects and opening up new horizons for humanity. Among the contemporary Indian Philosophers Sri Aurobindo positions unique as the victor of a new drive in philosophy. His philosophy attempts to synthesize the various observations of the world and points out that realization contains in the total understanding of Brahman which gratifies the demands of knowledge and experience, freedom and immortality. His major works include *The Life Divine, The Synthesis of Yoga, The Ideal of Human Unity, The Human Cycle, The Foundations of Indian Culture, The Secret of the Veda, Savitri* etc.

Sri Aurobindo mainly proposes to display that the governing principle of individual life and existence can equally be applicable to the collective life and existence since both of them have a parallel curve of evolution to reach an individual aim. In exemplifying and elucidating his social philosophy he was primarily inspired by the writings of a German historian, Karl Lamprecht to whom he refers at the very beginning of his book. One should recollect that after citing Lamprecht's name and the social stages stated by him once at the beginning of *The Human Cycle*, there is no more any mention of him or any supplementary discussion on him. Sri Aurobindo improves his own theory self-reliantly and his theory and cure of social development turns on its own positions. Sri Aurobindo in his *The Human Cycle* has accepted only the names of five stages of social cycle as advocated by Lamprecht. These stages according to Sri Aurobindo are packed with a very significant psychological explanation and connotation. But Sri Aurobindo's own analysis and evaluation are altogether dissimilar from that of Lamprecht. Sri Aurobindo, though he appreciates Lamprecht as an original mind, did not use his principle for his own philosophy. He only retained the suggestive names of the stages coined by Lamprecht. Sri Aurobindo advanced a psychological analysis of human society with its different periods (in the first six chapters of *The Human Cycle*) according to his integral metaphysical view, which is quite different from Lamprecht's interpretation. Let us give a brief account of the five cycles of society as described by Sri Aurobindo.

The Symbolic Period

Each civilization in its initial stage is imagined to be perforate by a durable symbolic mentality. Symbolic mentality progresses from intuitive and imaginative power

in man. Human ideas, customs, religion, institutions and other forms of culture bear the stamp of the symbolic mind and its intuitive ability. In the Vedic culture all the deeds were taken to be the symbols of the Divine. In a Mantra of *Zgveda*, the whole universe is described as being covered by puruca having thousand heads, thousand eyes and thousand legs[1].The symbolic mind textures an awfully shut relationship with the wide world around it and keenly responds to its calls and motivations. Man with the flexibility of instinct fees the mysterious depth of the character of things that, however, he flops to specific sufficiently in language. He is also conscious of an overwhelming power dwelling in nature which he efforts to utilize in shaping all aspects of his life, personal and social. Having realized the inadequacy of ordinary language in giving expression to his experience of the mysterious depth and overwhelming power of Nature, he makes increasing use of signs and symbols, similes and metaphors in his language. According to Sri Aurobindo, such a society found in the history of dawn of many civilization-Egyptian, Greek, Indian as well as many African and early American Tribes. In India, it happened among the sacred text age. Symbolic society was fairly dissimilar from the kind of society we perceive today. It had been then 'a free and fluid association', among that the man of the period 'not bounded by laws or institutions' used to follow the inner law of living, requiring neither to travel once his companions nor to be controlled by 'the iron yoke of the collectivity'. It had been thus a 'natural state of society'. Human life at this stage was not, in Hobbes words, 'nasty, barbarous and short'. And in this respect Sri Aurobindo's station is certainly opposed to Hobbes. Human relations, as said by Hobbes, are all governed by covenants and covenants without swords are but words. To put it otherwise, Hobbes discards the notion of symbolic mind and society and discounts the possibility of a 'free and fluid association'. One in every of the reasons why the majority do not subscribe the concept of a Golden Age is imagined to be that our intellect is discursive and destitute of intuitive and imaginative power.

To validate his concept of primitive symbolism Sri Aurobindo mentions to the earliest account of Indian society. The non-secular organizations of sacrifice (*yajña*), the social organizations of wedding (*vivâha*) and conjointly the fourfold solid order (*câturavarnya*), were all perforate by symbolism and mysticism. He takes up *the Zg-Vedic* hymn of wedding to as an instance his purpose. It was initially supposed to express the successive marriages of Surya, daughter of the Sun, to different Gods, but now it is supposed to be a marriage hymn for the union of human couple. Also he cites the case of *câturavarnya* which is now believed to be the result of an economic evolution complicated by political causes. But that was not the notion of the people of that Golden Age. In Sri Aurobindo's viewpoint of History, social improvement of humankind is a fact, but it is not a linear process. It is much more complex and many-sided. It is spiral, a zigzag method, in which there is often regression to make the progress more integrated.

The Typal-Conventional Period

The second stage, which we may call typal. This stage creates the great social ideals which remain impressed upon the human mind even when the stage itself is passed[2]. At this stage we see a growing power of reason, an increasing tendency to intellectualize the intuitive, impulsive, instinctive and subliminal modes of understanding. Used to moving in predetermined grooves, Mind steers away more and more from the vast unchartered world of symbolized truth. With the advance of intellectual sophistication, one notices a new procedure and new tendency in the different spheres of culture: man bids farewell to everything but creed, institution, formal practice and ethics. The old mystic and occult features are generally forgotten. Once they unit preserved, they are preserved exclusively at intervals the kind of rituals and myths, forgetting their inner religious content. The living spiritual skill provides way to faith, emotional fervor and ethical conduct. Religion becomes an other-worldly affairs; ethics assumes the position or religion. *Shastra* replaces *dharma*.

The average human mind of the period detached from the living and moving symbols and, in order to fill up rational vacuum, accepts and follows some dead types and formulae. In spite of this mechanical turn of the human mind, Sri Aurobindo never denies the superiority of the typal age over the symbolic stage. This distorted and highly theory-laden view of religion is attributed by Sri Aurobindo to the insight less mechanical solid of the fashionable positivist minded anthropologist. In the typal period the people normally forget the benefit and the implication of fluid and flexible associations of the former stage. The spiritual ideals of the *câturvarnya* are gradually substituted by some relatively rigid socio-ethical ideals. The social model of honour becomes very widespread. The honour of the *Brahmin* contains in his purity, piety and spirituality, and that of *Kshatriya* in chivalry, strength and nobility of character in action. The social honour of the *Vaishya* lies in business ethics, whereas it is the rendering of devoted service that makes in *Sudra* noble. Another chief feature of the typal phase is gradual degeneration of symbols into sign and type. Symbols begin to lose their vast world of suggestion and settle themselves into a social world of ethical ideals. True ethical ideals are inferior substitutes for spiritual symbols: yet they are flexible and supple enough to adjust themselves to the diverse calling of practical life and to be in accord with different views of life. The early period of Buddhism represents the typal stage of Indian civilization, when old symbolic ideals spiritual life had been slowly disappearing under the growing influence of the teaching of Buddha and Mahavira. Neither the Buddha nor the Mahavira are rational in their attitude to the problem of life, society and religion. But the religious originated on their teaching assumed an institutional character and started exhibiting a tendency of rationalization and ratiocination. And the simple and supple truths of the masters were almost suppressed under the weight of the logical logomachies of their disciples. The seers were followed by thinkers, the symbols of types.

From the above account of the typal-conventional period of the human cycle one might consider that nothing essential and valuable happened at that time. But that would be wholly wrong impression. On the opposing, much of what we are pleased of today is to a great extent a gift and contribution that period. The conventional passé appeared in the post-Vedic civilization of India with a large-lined advance. The socio-cultural attainments of the time are extremely significant and have proved of lasting value. One of the intensely felt problems of the typal-conventional period is the relative weakness of the spiritual basis of life congenital from the symbolic period. As this root is not broad enough to provision the growing pressure and forces of practical and rational life of the latter stage, impatient detractors start enquiring the very value of the spiritual root of practical life. The typal-conventional period, through rigid in its outer structure, does not stifle all that it inherits from the past. The brilliant ideas and inspirations of the symbolic age receive new rational interpretations, if truth be told among the bounds of time. The main characteristic of the stage is to solemnize everything in the name of stabilization preservation. The method of stabilization and preservation is irrefutably essential to communicate a definite character to the fluid ideas and ideas of the symbolic past. But the craze for stabilization and systematization instead of being a promoter of social progress looks to be its fetter in follow. And this occurred not only in India but also in the West.

Human civilization lives in this period more in its outer structure than in its inner spirit. The attainments of the time are, so, predominantly fundamental, while the spirit suffers within the dark inner of the brightly illumined chamber of sound reason. Easily fascinated by the outer glamour and grandeur of the cultural life, the rationalist mind of the period tends to forget the inner truth and spirit. In the background of evolution Sri Aurobindo is a determinist, but in the background of socio-political institute he is a proponent of individual freedom. He discovers no incompatibility between the two. If we have a tendency to run into the scheme of Nature, Sri Aurobindo assures us, we might discover an all-pervading spiritual harmony in which man is basically free, each within the synchronic and additionally within the diachronic ways that, though he critically refers to the 'inevitable' collectivized finish of the individualism, Sri Aurobindo does not deny that the Western world owes its strength, enlightenment, progress, and expansion to that.

The Individualistic-Subjective Age

The conventional period cannot last for long as some individuals' rebellion against it. This individualistic stage is otherwise recognized as the stage of rebellion or the stage of self-consciousness. The rebellion which is maintained by reason gives the

scope for social development after providing liberty to the members of society. An individual starts question through reason whether the convention supported or not, which is nothing but the hunt for the truth. It is in Europe that the age of individualism has taken birth and exercised its full sway; the East has entered into it only by contact and influence, not from an original impulse[3]. The instinct of the Indian Renaissance was neither original nor native. It was due typically to Western influence. Every cultural structure, whatever might be the form of its identity, is open to foreign influences. When at the end of the long typal-conventional age India was groping in the dark, trying to understand its inner truth, Western influence brought the light. The beginning of the age of Individualism and Reason is always marked by skepticism. India proved no exception. The age of Individualism in the East is not more than a hundred years old. But in the meanwhile the new forced performed in the West and its influence did not allow the East to travel in her own leisurely way the full length of the age of Individual and Reason. And this new force was socialism. Actually, two very distinct standards of society are initiate to have influenced the human mind history-one is the ideal of liberty and the other that of uniformity. One advocates additional chance, and so the different additional equality. In spite of their diverse ways of social life, thought and action, the adherence of nations to the above two ideals is common very significant. It designates that we have not yet been able to come out of the domain of the limited and unrealized possibilities of the age of individualism, rationalism and freedom which at an equivalent time, still the limitation, we have a tendency to all area unit tight form of socio-political uniformity and equality.

The inevitability of a new mode of human life, thought and society has made itself felt in the more perceptive minds. Thus far man has not been able to realize a way of life which will encourage human unity. This is the highest necessity of the subjective age, the last rhythm of the human cycle. Sri Aurobindo considers that the consummation of this rhythm would take man on the far side manhood and a brand-new panorama would be opened before him. The objective ages of typalism-conventionalism and individualism-rationalism area unit currently matters of the past and cannot be recurrent. Though they could not fulfill all that required, their importance must not be minimized. With the way of time human nature and its necessities change. The form of the symbolic age is now useless; but we require the spirit of that age is a new form. We want a subjective attitude for the solutions of our problems, an assertion of all valuable and useful things of the past and present, and the refutation of all dead types and conventions, harmful angularities, injustice and inequality, and, above all, transformation of all forms and trans valuation of all values. Unless man the chief tool and agency of change is he adequately transformed and made equal to the task, our ideals would remain unfilled impossible dreams. The normal man of the day is very deprived in self-consciousness

and ignorant of his own inner nature (*swadharma*) and the demand of the age (*yugadharma*).In subjective age man will come to possess the Supermind through which he can know that matter, life and mind are the non-manifested forms of Sat, Cit and Supermind of Brahman respectively. In this age each and every member of society will realize this harmony resulting in the Age of Divine or Spirit which is the ultimate goal of society. In this way, society will turn into a Divine one where each and every member possesses Divine body. Among the five platforms of human society – i.e. the symbolic, the typal, the conventional, the individualistic and subjective, the last platform i.e. the subjective platform stands in the highest realm. It has an instant link with the Divinity hidden within the human nature. In the subjective platform of human life, human beings gather self-knowledge about themselves and this standard of self-knowledge helps them sufficiently to identify the inner divinity which remains unknown by us in other circumstances of life. We are able to say that this well-known stage i.e. the subjective platform will be the base of making an individual life a suitable instance of Sri Aurobindo's long-precious dream of Life Divine. Therefore the Subjective platform is the way which makes us ahead towards his most precious dream of Life Divine.

There remains enormous possibility to go ahead to the subjective phase of society. In that last stage we have to re-establish the True Self, Luminous Self or Secret Godhead hidden within all human being. In the subjective phase we have to recognize ourselves from within. The subjective phase is actually our trip from the outward or external world (may be the physical world) towards the inward or the internal world (the mental world). In the individualistic platform an individual has to recognize his own individuality devoid of any communal sentiment. But in the subjective period every individual has to identify himself with other human beings as all are representatives of the same Almighty or the Brahman. We all, at this final platform, has to identify itself with God. So within the former individualistic stage, individual '" God and within the final or subjective stage individual = God himself. It sounds similar with the main theme of the Advaita Vedanta philosophy – "*givo Brahmana naparah*" i.e. individual is nothing else but God himself. The resonance of the same could be revealed in *Srimad Bhagavad Gītā* when in verse 20 of the 10th chapter Sri Krishna spoke to Arjuna –

Ahamātmāgudrākeśasarvabhūtāśayasthitah.

Ahmādiścamadhyancvabhūtānāmantaeva ca||10/20||

[O Arjuna, I am the one and only divine soul hidden within all human being. I am the cause behind their creation and also of destruction.]

Sri Aurobindo's social theory can be designated as teleological. The purpose of this theory is to form a Divine society, *BhāgavataSamāja*. The Sāṃkhya philosophy is also teleological, but it purposes completely different from that of Sri Aurobindo's

philosophy. According to Sāṃkhya the change which occurs within Prakṛti, is for the enjoyment of puruṣa, a metaphysical concept. But in Sri Aurobindo's philosophy change occurring in society is for the attainment of Divine society. In the *SrimadBhāgavata* also a description of social change has been given. The four phases of society recognized as *Satya, Tretā, Dvāpara* and *Kali Yuga* are recognized. In the first phase known as *Satya yuga*, the Pure Religion containing of four *Pādas*, meditation, purity, mercy and truth prevailed. *Tretāyuga* as only three features (among four) were found to be existing in this period. In the same way, two features were found to be present in the *Dvāpara yuga* and one element in *kali yuga*. Both the *Bhāgavata* and Sri Aurobindo do not admit the occurrence of the identical ontological scheme in each cycle. In Sri Aurobindo's exploration it initiates that some persons will revolt against the conventional system in individualistic age. *Bhāgavata* moreover states that in *Tretāyuga* some individuals will revolt and effort to eliminate the non-religious institutions. Sri Aurobindo same that when the termination of the subjective age a personal being can type the Vedic society in an exceedingly new spirit with the assistance of individual reason. The approaching of *Satya Yuga* once the ending of *Kali yuga* has been also foreseen in the *Bhāgavata*. But *Satya Yuga* can be recovered through God's incarnation. The Pure Religion existing in *Satya yoga* can be recovered through Divine interference from which it follows that the individuals cannot recovered *Satya yuga* with the help of their reason. In the *Bhāgavata* imperfect potentiality has been recognized in a personal being, whereas in Sri Aurobindo's philosophy the individual being has been recognized as having limitless potentiality. Thus a personal being will type the supra-mental society being enlightened through his own reason, however not through Divine incarnation. The design of social change as sponsored by Sri Aurobindo is spiral. This society will be advanced in technology and engineering but the spiritual outlook will remain the same. Sri Aurobindo however maintains that the evolutionary process is not advancing in a straight line, but in a series of cycles. He has described this change as 'spiral' what is available in the symbolic stage will be repeated at the age of the superman spirally which is an ideal society. His theory of evolution is regarded to the future development of man and society.

The social philosophy of Sri Aurobindo delivers a notion of equality among all men. The realization of Divine society (Bhâgavata*Samāja*) where there will be no inequality among men in respect of dignity, status and honour is the ultimate goal of his philosophy. The principle that every man enjoying equal facility and honour will be perfect, happy and powerful offers the idea of communism in society. The viewpoint of Sri Aurobindo that individual freedom is not freedom or salvation is really noticeable in that sense that a man cannot live in a society honestly or perfectly if others are not honest or perfect. In other words, a man cannot adore his own property or exercise his own right if other do not co-operate with him. Keeping in the vision the idea that our peaceful existence depends on that of the fellow member, Sri Aurobindo creates an

attitude to man who knows the truth to enthuse other fellows of society for understanding the Truth, the only way through which the collective freedom or salvation can be achieved. In social philosophy, Sri Aurobindo has offered that each and every man can possess infinite power by awakening *Caityapuruṣaexisting* in him, which provides honour and respect to mankind. The principle that a man is not only above God but he may be God with the help of awakening the *Caityapurṣca,*has given highest dignity to mankind. From the philosophical supposed of Sri Aurobindo, a man will acquire to honour another man as he is also the abode of Infinite, which assistances to form a maliceless and peaceful society.

Thus, it can be claimed that Sri Aurobindo's theory of social development, displays a gleam of expectation to the humanity. It recovers the faith of man in him-self by revealing to him that he is not controlled by the external forces, that his destiny is in his own hands and that he can make his world a better and even a perfect place to live in. The contribution of Sri Aurobindo lies in the assimilation of the modern scientific world with the spiritualism of the ancient world. Once we achieve this, a just social order can be created. In view of the disasters faced by our world today, a world which has seen two world wars and is not far from the third, the increasing terror, racial, economic, social and political clashes all over, there is a necessity for this spiritual reinterpretation and only then can real peace be established. The spiritual society considered by Sri Aurobindo, based on the notion of unity and harmony may offer a way out of the disaster which is being faced by the present civilization.

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Ethics, Innovation and Moral Training

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Abstract

'Despite their many differences, the theories of Kant, Ross and the utilitarian had at least one thing in common: they were all designed to answer directly the question "What should I do?" In other words, each philosopher was concerned, in the main, with providing a viable theory of obligation, the aim of which was to help us determine which actions we should perform in any situation in which we find ourselves.'[1]: what I ought to do? What is right and what is wrong? Obviously, these are some of the fundamental questions of moral philosophy time to time, and thinkers have been providing different –different theories regarding them, but in such kind of theories, there is always a series of questions and ideals which we miss, that follow: why to be moral? , what I ought to be?Are these theories helping us to know mere morality or are they actually making us moral? And the moral ideals like 'being good' and 'virtuous'. They focus on 'what should I do' instead of 'what I ought to be'. The paper concerns that morality is internal (as Kant says morality within) so it also has to be expressed in the 'be this' and not only in the 'do this'; at least there must be a difference between commandments and moral philosophy. "What I am to be?" Or "What is the ideal character I should pursue from a moral point of view etc. are equally important issues to discuss.In this paper, we will discuss some of these issues and essential motivations that can be helpful in moral training and character upliftment. We will also discuss some 'what's', 'why's', and 'how's' of ethics and morality to gain purpose and clear perspective.

Keywords– *Ethics, Virtue, Moral Training, What, Why, How*

Introduction

To introduce our primary intention let's recall and reinterpret the *Kalidasa* to know the importance of ethics, morality and human values -

purāṇamityevanasādhusarvaṃnacāpikāvyaṃnavamityavadyam|
santaḥparīkṣyānyataradbhajantemūḍhaḥparapratyayaneyabuddhiḥ||[2]

The classical interpretation of this *Kalidassloka* from **Malavikagnimitram** suggests that- that all that is old or classical is not good, nor is poetry bad because it is new, good or bad is decided by a philosophical man, only by proper inquiry. (Only) a fool and conformist mind led by the judgement of others. But now it is time when we need to reinterpret it because so many factors have included in the society which led to so many crises including moral crisis. It is the time when we need to think that all is not rejected because it is old and not everything is condemned because it's new. It is now a trend but a crisis as well, in the name of novelty, whatever is old is obsolete and useless and new is considered to be trending. But can it be true about ethics and morality? Is it a good approach to reject the old pearls of wisdom and values because we don't find their followers or don't find any implementation? I think its flawed reasoning to reject something, it could be our fault if we couldn't apply those values in our life, and it doesn't make them obsolete. We can't consider the ancient moral legacy obsolete because we don't find any implementation of their teaching and reasoning on the ground level, instead of we ought to introspect that it might be our failure that we couldn't apply those moral standards due to weakness of will and lack of moral courage…

Exposing Major Threats to Ethics: Strengthening the Foundation of Morality

In a recent time so many thinkers such as Richard Taylor, Pierre Hadot, and peter singer etc. have come up with an approach that suggests that the philosophical discussion of good and evil, right and wrong must not be confined to the sterile lecture halls of academics but related instead to ordinary human life and its moral problems. This thing actually needs to be taken into account that the single-minded approach to understanding moral issues by exploring human reason only will always fail because we are creatures of multiple faculty such as emotions, psyche, etc. Typically most of the moral issues arise from our intense and inescapable longing and dilemmas. One of the most noted crises in the rational theorist of morality is that they distinguish between good and evil by converting the real problems of ethics into complex philosophical puzzles. We need to look at this approach more critically for a more meaningful conception by re-examining the whole rationalistic tradition that dominates philosophical ethics.

Crisis, dilemmas, catastrophes and many other problems are typical parts of humanity. It takes innovation and new ideas to come up with creative solutions that address the obstacles at hand. Ethics (way of life) and morality (that tells us what is wrong and what is right) can be seen as one of the greatest source of wisdom for people to experience self-discovery and provide inspiration for innovative and practical solutions to the challenges humanity faces every day.[3] In facing a harsh reality, people must affirm to survive, using critical thinking and moral courage as an essential value of a good life. As Albert Camus penned "A man without ethics is a wild beast loosed upon this world."[4]Some people think that morality is obsolete. They consider ethics and morality as a system of mere prohibitions, mainly propagated to prevent people from having fun. It is easy to conclude that there's a deficit of ethical and moral standards in the world today. But it is not the fact, there's not a lack of morality in the world; there's too much. It is just a flawed perspective which needs to be reverted.

It is a misconception that ethics is just an ideal system that is noble in theory but no good in practice. It is perhaps one of the biggest damage of meta-ethicist that proclaims -it is not the duty of the moral philosopher to make someone moral because philosophy work is an only intellectual enterprise. This view is defective; although it's opposite that a moral standard that is no good in practice must suffer from a theoretical lacuna seems quite fine because the main purpose of moral judgments is to guide practice when needed but if it fails to do so then it needs to be evaluated. Sceptics assume that ethics is inapplicable to the practical world because they regard it as a system of short and simple rules of 'do's and don'ts '.It is a very big challenge to put this idea in the mind of the people that ethics and morality is an integral part of humans, and we all need to embrace it for the betterment of self as well as society. Otherwise, there is more chance that the discipline which can be the instrument of human life improvement may leave for philology or just the permutation combination of word …as Lucius Seneca a stoic philosopher put it regarding philosophy which was much more associated with ethics at that time -"There are indeed mistakes made, through the fault of our advisors, who teach us how to debate and not how to live. There are also mistakes made by students, who come to their teachers to develop, not their souls, but their wits. Thus, philosophy, the study of wisdom, has become philology, the study of words."[5] These words sound true at the current time when moral philosophy has strongly lost its sight due to the domination of some philosophies such as logical positivism, analytical philosophy, and linguistic trend etc. the question which strongly demands the attention of the wise people of the world has somehow lost its the strength of vowing the intellectual.

Today conceptual or logical analysis of moral and ethical concepts is the major task before the moral philosopher. After the philosophical investigation by Ludwig

Wittgenstein analysis of moral concepts has occupied the attention of moral perspective and emotivist and the moral values are to be practised and lived is no more part of the moral philosophy due to that The early records of what comes down as history of Philosophy were certainly a desire to know the world, our place in it and search for a way to live it well. Isn't a crisis that a vulgar and an immoral person can be considered as a very good moral philosopher? This trend can claim that moral philosophy has nothing to do with the moral life.[6]There was respect for the world and oneself a sense of worth. The Analytic movement comes at a time when German idealism and many institutions seem to almost clampdown free critical thought. The analysts, therefore, take a modest methodological view, it seemed that before we talk about what there is, how it is known let us analyse how we represent. The logical positivists used analysis to reject what they thought was metaphysics and thought of science as the final provider of truth. Not all analytical thinkers thought so. Analytical Philosophy is only a view about how to do Philosophy and Austin says it is part of one view about how to go about.

I think much of the present-day implicit understanding is that older questions about what is the nature of reality and human beings, is there a purpose of human life? Is there a Good intrinsically valuable? Are questions which have been rendered irrelevant because of Darwin? The Transcendental or functional theories of Plato and Aristotle are also rendered irrelevant. Modern Discussion in political and ethical theories like Rawls speaks of only convenient orderliness. I think we need to see this carefully. The foundational/ ant foundational, enchanted/ disenchanted world contrast is useful but need more thought. I feel we are still torn between hankerings for old foundational thinking. I also think it is not necessary to imagine that analytical techniques cannot help in foundational thinking with the first-order second order and many other distinctions. Strangely when people talk about narratives and multiple narratives in a postmodern world it may seem that in an awkward way the older grand narratives of foundational Philosophy can still hold charm for some. I do think abstract thinking is valuable and distinctively human ...we are special as we can philosophize, we can create beauty and much more kind compassionate institutions of love and care.

Some thinkers are even more radical and sceptics towards morality and similar disciplines , for an instance Marx regularly advocated ethics and morality, along with religion and law, as forms of suppressive ideology, 'so many bourgeois prejudices behind which lurk just as many bourgeois interests…'[7]But he does not crisitisze only bourgeois ideas about morality. He rejects the whole notion of ethics, morality and whole normative disciplines itself. This relative Ideology suggests that the materialistic idea of history and human civilization ethos, by expressing the relation between ethical ideology and material class interests, has 'broken the backbone of all ethics and moral principles ',

irrespective of its content or class affiliation. Marx felt that he must apologize to Engels for it: 'I was obliged to insert two phrases about "duty" and "right" ... ditto about "truth, morality and justice", but these are placed in such a way that they can do no harm…' ''When an imaginary critic charges that 'communism does away with all morality and religion instead of forming them anew', the Communist Manifesto replies not by denying that this charge is true, but instead by observing that just as the communist revolution will involve a radical break with all traditional property relations, so it will also involve the most radical break with all traditional ideas. Evidently it is Marx's view that just as doing away with bourgeois property will be one task of the communist revolution, so 'doing away with all morality' will be another. Marx even goes so far as to side with moral evil against moral good. He insists that in history 'it is always the bad side which finally triumphs over the good side. For the bad side is the one which brings movement to life, which makes history by bringing the struggle to fruition….''[8]

A communist often express a radically contemptuous attitude toward morality, they holds a notion towards morality and suggest that it nothing but a form of illusion, false consciousness or ideology. But this attitude hard to understand. What argument can they give for doing so, and how can they advise others to do so as well, if they rejects that all notions to ethics and morality? It is actually a natural consequence of Marxist presupposition when he holds the materialist conception of history. Actually we do not need to give so any logical argument to this regime , only the historical instances are enough to the follower of the path ,only it would be enough to show how much damaging it was to the society to live without ethics,law,morality and religion. As Adam smith maintain"Without this sacred regard to general rules, there is no man whose conduct could be depended upon. It is which constitutes the most essential difference between a man of principle and honour and a worthless fellow" … "For not at least of the advantages of our all acting according to commonly accepted moral rules is that our actions are predictable by others and the actions of others are predictable by us, with the result that we are all better to cooperate with each other in helping each other to pursue our individual ends…"[9]Although Marx's view has done so much damage to history, his attack on morality raises significant issues concerning the way we should think about morality. These were some challenges or to say threats to ethics and morality, there can so many which need to be tackled for the betterment of society and morality itself

The question always will be how to lead a good life. If we have a divine or natural purpose we need to know it and have tests to ascertain whether we got it right, then we have to train the will to follow it. If there is no divine or natural purpose we have to see what we value in terms of our social and natural environment, even here it does not become arbitrary or subjective. The question again would be how do we know

and ascertain whether we got it right. Methods of analysis will help; we may also go to Kant for tact and taste. There is also intuition which is particularly a delicate issue but repeated by many in the history of Philosophy. The human surplus in terms of creative imagination is for us to see all over. The normative picture of humanity in Marx and many also amply demonstrates that love for knowledge will continue to be fundamental to all life; we need to know to discover, to appreciate to transform and to create. ..Marx is impatient to change but he too will change with the right knowledge and right moral values. I think the joys of deep thinking are great we must invite everyone to engage and also enjoy the history of this joyous Enterprise of love.

It is an important question to discuss what is that thing which leads so many individuals to follow moral evil. How can an individual fight back against moral evil? If we propose from the moral historical point of view we can draw a picture that we ought to cultivate a moral autonomy, follow the truth and moral courage. Remain sceptical of the justifications for evil doings. Solzhenitsyn's ideas on such questions: ''to do evil a human being must, first of all, believe that what he's doing is good, or else that it's a well-considered act in conformity with natural law. Fortunately, it is like the human being to seek a justification for his actions.Ideology – that is what gives evildoing its long-sought justification and gives the evildoer the necessary steadfastness and determination. That is the social theory which helps to make his acts seem good instead of bad in his own and others' eyes so that he won't hear reproaches and curses but will receive praise and honours. That was how the agents of the Inquisition fortified their wills: by invoking Christianity; the conquerors of foreign lands, by extolling the grandeur of their Motherland; the colonizers, by civilization; the Nazis, by race; and the Jacobins (early and late), by equality, brotherhood, and the happiness of future generations.''[10]

It is a fact that the thing which can be an instrument of service can be moulded to a medium of destruction; it is all up to us how we use that. For instance, religion served humanity since antiquity, but all of sudden a position has set up, which says religion is opium or religion corrupts but is it a fact? Similarly, ethics have been kept aside from guiding human life. It needs to be researched. We need to ask whether any discipline corrupts man or it is a man who corrupts that discipline. Thus no culture and civilization are intrinsically bad, it is the people, who shape them; it is up to them what kind of form they want to give, good or evil, right or wrong. So blaming is just an excuse, we need to get out of it positively. We are arguing this thing because ethics also sometimes go through such kind of threats. Methodology, purpose, and soon all such sort of factors decide the future of any discipline, thus we need tochoose them carefully. Based on the above discussion we propose that it need to be realised that ethics and morality are practical disciplines, and we all must try to preserve this legacy and pursue it for well-being and good life. It is a challenge in front of thinkers to preserve the

originality of ethics and morality. There can also be some other challenges to ethics and morality, in various ways; these challenges seem to suggest that ethics and moral life is somehow impossible. Let's discuss them –

What is an Appropriate Approach for Morality?

We live at a time where science, technology, economics and GDP have diminished our physical suffering to a remarkable degree and have impacted humanity at a larger scale. But can the same be said about our psychological, emotional, spiritual and social suffering? For while our life spans have been prolonged, and many diseases eradicated, per capita income has increased, the time and space can be covered surprisingly but this has not changed our existential, spiritual and moral predicament. Obviously, science and technology have so much to offer, but it has lacuna and most of the time fails to imbue our life with meaning, peace and prosperity which is quite a metaphysical, ethical and social and not something wired in technology. This role has traditionally been played by ethics, morality, faith, religions and myth and the path of morality they have shown to us. People who prefer novel thing might find it ridiculous but it's a fact that the paths of ethics and morality are one of those ways which can help us to achieve well-being and Good life. It is a matter of deep crisis that despite having all sort s of materialistic comforts mankind is divided in the name of race, faith and civilization and as consequence violence, clashes, hatred and intolerance are the typical parts of humanity, or we are immune to such kind of negativity.

So when science struggles to find the solution for humanities and its problems thenbased on this crisis, there is always a series of question that follows: which approach is more suitable for the good and moral society and individuals, scientific approach or philosophical way? What is more appropriate for moral progress? I think the answer lies beyond of instruments and material affluence, somewhere amid humanities.it is a misconception that natural science will ever be capable to solve the rigorous moral dilemmas and moral crisis because morality can't be coded like science tries rather morality has got its own objectivity which favours right and negate wrong.

There is a widespread view in the ethical world that supposes that morality is 'purely subjective and individualistic' which seems quite problematic. The problem lies in the fact that it will direct morality towards relativism or subjectivism which is neither good for society nor moral realism. How? Let see- the basic lacuna which relativist has is that they presume that the act which they perform motivates them to think that if it's true for them, then its true to everyone else too, irrespective of experiments. But we need to acknowledge that if someone claims that doing something wrong based on relativism is right, then they are mistaken. Now thinkers somehow searching for the ontological aspect of morality, researching the objective nature of it

and finds relativism to be a threat to ethics and morality.[11]Individual choice, dignity and freedom is the foundation of any moral principle but a sense of justice ought to govern those choices otherwise crude relativism is waiting for us, so many brutal instances can be traced in the history which is easy to justify based on subjectivism and relativism. It is not just a matter of subjective personal preference; it's an objective moral fact that the thing which wrong is wrong and right is right. It is a real problem where emotive moralists misunderstood moral issues by comparing scientific facts and statements with moral facts. objective moral standards is not a fact in the scientific term which can be verified or experimented but factual in a sense that we can't experiment on any wrong act then know whether something is wrong or not.

In this approach, we also find a major confusion between fact & opinion. For an instance a relativist may consider murder is wrong unless somebody says something mean about their loved one, however, this relativist approach is flawed, trying to drive out a fact out of opinion, making preference a fact. It is like saying, "my favourite cricket team in the cricket world cup in India, and therefore India is the best team in the World Cup." It is just a matter of opinion being put into a fact. Thus A moral fact can be addressed in many ways but a fact is still a fact. The logic of non-contradiction applies to all facts. Another problem which is to be found in relativism is that it commits a fallacy when someone equates what people do with what they ought to. This approach has no other explanation than "we ought to do what we do," which is a circular argument as well as begging so many questions.If anyone says that one moral statement is same as any other moral statements (moral relativism) then I think that person is like who is trying to become a grammar expert of a language which he doesn't even know. These difficulties are enough to refute ethical relativism; moral subjectivism at least prevents making nonsense of the valiant efforts of would-be moral reformers, for it makes moral judgments depend on the approval or disapproval of the person making the judgment, rather than that person's society. There are other difficulties, though, that at least some forms of ethical subjectivism cannot overcome.

Another problem which we find in moral relativism is that if we suppose that Man doesn't seem to be intrinsically, instinctively or essentially morally courageous, and since moral acts take plenty of 'moral –courage' and 'moral will' so due to this weakness one may use the 'if-then' or any other relativist method or contextual approach as a permanent excuse to run away from moral responsibilities. Here objection which a contextualist may have would be that to speak of "plenty of moral courage" and 'weakness of will' to be moral agent 'Sounds too much of self-obsession, maybe a typical trait of the unfinished project of anthropocentrism. In a perfect world, virtue would always be rewarded and vice would never flourish. But what can we do, here in our imperfect world, when immorality promises great rewards? What to do when moral

behaviour ismet with ridicule, a prison term, or a bullet? It is easy when morality and self-interest give the same advice. But what if they don't? The answer to this objection would be that it is unfinished task of humans to be moral saint which have to explore constantly, moral perfection is not something reaching one point to another instead of it's a lifelong process towards which we can proceed and progress. There isnothing wrong or loss in it, but in itsopposite, it is not so.

Why Should Be Moral And Virtuous?

Plato in his masterpiece 'the republic' argues that those who are unjust are always harmed and suffer because of their injustice and wrongdoing. He argues that all-powerful demagogues and cheaters, though able to control and acquire so much in this world, are still doomed to suffering. Even as they make self-consolation about how much they are enjoying, basically they are having the false pleasure, constantly fearful and insecure due to moral guilt, lives a lifeof anxiety and disgust. Once we realise the hard truth of an immoral life by any means introspection or experience, we will get to know that we are far better off being moral. But there is a problem with this Plato's argument which is that it depends onhis presupposition about the inner lives of immoral people. But it doesn't make hiscase fully persuasive. Certainly, many immoral people who have moral sense are deeply troubled and unhappy. But what if the case is the opposite? What if bad guys sometimes have a lot of fun in the meantime, and never regret the harm they have caused. Then what will be the moral motivation tothe latter category? Why should I be Moral? This is a very common question supposed to be discussed for a better future of morality.

A very valid and natural point, Well, there might be several reasons and answer to this depending on the specific dimension being considered. The sociological factor would be that without ethics and morality, discipline and systematicity of social life are nearly impossible. The psychological reason, as we Plato talked, suggests that people care about what others think of them which is concerned with reputation and social censure. No one would like to be called a good thief or liar. If we simply try to search, what human being seeks and what brings him well-being, we will find that there are some positive values which are essential for human fulfilment, integrity, self and social worth, and tranquillity. On the other hand, there are some positions that everyone tries to escape or overcome such as shame, guilt, social detachment etc. now let us ask what leads to well-being and gratitude. What is the best path for harmony? We will find that the goals and paths which ethics and closed disciplines like positive psychology concern represents the best way to the goals of human beings, it refined the whole course of life.

Another motivation for doing well can be a religious one. Theological factor suggests that people care about what will happen after death, to their soul or spirit. For

many religions, there is an afterlife that involves a person's being rewarded or punished (Soteriology argument) or in other word metaphysics too work for some law of karma, rebirth etc. as Immanuel Kant gave three metaphysical law to be the foundation of morality. In this realm, there can be another concept that god again become essential for morality as Dostoevsky proposed a warning 'If God does not exist everything is permitted', becomes more apparent. And for common sense, a better way to understand this concept can be these questions based on the golden principle of morality follows: Would we like other people to behave morally with us? How often would we prefer others to behave justly with us, All the time or rarely?. If the answer is all the time, then don't we think (most) others, if not all, would answer the same? If the case is that everyone likes to be treated justly and fairly, all the time, then isn't implying that everybody needs to behave morally towards all others all the time? We can recall Aristotle's advice;   we have reason to stick with the appearances and to take things at face value until we are given excellent reason for doubt. It *seems* that killing, rape, and theft are very clear cases of immorality, especially when they are done to serve self-interest.

This golden rule largely accepted in the moral discussion and has been discussed at various platforms including religious and spiritual one. Almost every religion and culture, at some point, accept this law importance. Treat others as you would like to be treated. As such, the golden rule is perhaps the most basic of personal virtues and can be used for the socio-cultural purpose and identity. This rule advocates humanity to get beyond their own selfishness, egoism and self-absorbed isolation. The golden rule prescribes that what hurts us hurts others and that what heals us, heals others.

These were all external factors to do something good, but in actual sense pursuing morality in itself is good and essential .we have no other option and an excuse of not to follow the moral path .as of these dimensions which we discussed above, conscience theory is the only in-itself explanation. Conscience, some people care about doing the right thing only for its sake. It is essential for their overall development. Socrates shows how the choice of immoral action is bad business and not in favour of well-being. Socratic arguments show how immoral acts are irrational or insincere or hypocritical or unhealthy for the spirit. As Bradley argues 'Why should I be moral? The question is natural, and yet seems strange. It appears to be one we ought to ask, and yet we feel, when we ask it, that we are wholly removed from the moral point of view. To ask the question why? Is rational; for reason teaches us to do nothing blindly, nothing without end or aim. She teaches us that what is good must be good for something and that what is good for nothing is not good at all. And so we take it as certain that there is an end on one side, means on the other; and that only if the end is good, and the means

conduce to it, have we a right to say the means are good. It is rational, then, always to inquire, why should I do it?''[12]

Here the problem is quite strange. For rational morality teaches us, that if we look at it only as good for something else, we never, in that case, have reached every, and perhaps reach. What is it good for? A good must be good for something and that what is good for nothing is not good at all. Rationality suggests that moral pursuit is an end to be desired for its own sake, and not as a means to something external or beyond. As Bradley put it ''degrade her (morality), and she disappears; and, to keep her, we must love and not merely use her. And so at the question Why? We are in trouble, for that does assume, and does take for granted, that virtue in this sense is unreal, and what we believe is false. Both virtue and the asking why? seem rational, and yet incompatible one with the other, and the better course will be, not forthwith to reject virtue in favour of the question, but rather to inquire concerning the nature of the Why?''

Can Virtue and Morality be Taught?

Socrates argues doing the right thing is always acting in a person's own interest, as is ''tending one's own soul'': [My] attempt to prove that all things are knowledge, including justice, and temperance, and courage … tends to show that virtue can certainly be taught; … if virtue is entirely knowledge, … then I cannot but suppose that virtue is capable of being taught.[13]Can ethics and morality as a philosophical discipline striving to grasp how one ought to live to be effective at transforming deprave-ridden individuals into virtuous and good human beings? There have been numerous thinkers throughout history who have been sceptical that it can do this practical task. Immanuel Kant, for an instance, understood that within the discipline of moral philosophy there is a vast lacuna which exists between theoretical and intellectual enterprise and practical implementation of that. He points out to ancient philosophy: When will you finally begin to live virtuously?'' said Plato to an old man who told him he was attending classes on virtue "The point is not always to speculate, but also ultimately to think about applying our knowledge. Today, however, he who lives in conformity with what he teaches is taken for a dreamer.''[14]

Arthur Schopenhauer was even more cynical regarding the possibility of morality influencing one's actions and duty, writing: "Virtue cannot be taught; no more than genius…We would thus be just as foolish to expect that our moral systems and ethics might awaken the virtuous, noble, and saintly as that our aesthetics might awaken poets, sculptors, and musicians.''[15] However, this view is not shared by all, and as Richard Taylor, in his book Good and Evil, who saw ethics in a more optimistic light points out: "The question "what is good?" Is certainly the most important question you can ask? For it comes to this: each of us has one life to live, and that life can be, as it commonly

is, wasted in the pursuit of specious goals, things that turn out worthless the moment they are possessed, or it can be made a deliberate and thoughtful art, wherein what was sought and, let us hope, in some measure gained, was something all the while worth striving for. Or we can put it this way: there will come a day for each of us to die, and on that day, if we have failed, we shall have failed irrevocably."[16]Our argument in the favour that morality and virtue can be that If aesthetical sense can be stimulated by an artist, painter, singer, poet and sculpture then why can't an ethicist or moral philosopher helps and individual and society to become moral, at least both disciplines ethics and aesthetics belong to axiology.

Here I think virtue ethics, moral and positive psychology can help us to imbue the positive characteristics and moral standards into behaviours since the fundamental ethical question for virtue ethicist is "What should I be?" not "What should I do?". Actually, Our moral life is often complex and reasonable people will disagree about what ought to be done in particular sets of circumstances. As one similarly minded theorist put it: … morality is internal. The moral law … has to be expressed in the form, "be this," not in the form "do this." … [T]he true moral law says "hate not," instead of "kill not." … [T]he only mode of stating the moral law must be as a rule of character.[17] Virtue ethics is that it seems to take better account of the importance we place on motivating factors in the moral assessment of actions and persons. Theories such as Kant's and Mill's which focus on providing tests of right and wrong action are sometimes criticized for ignoring the motivating factor people have in doing what they do. If one is to be a moral person, is it enough to abide by Kant's categorical imperative? Is it enough to make sure that one maximizes utility which mill purposes? Perhaps not. Ideas can be facts, but life seems to be a task which has to be lived with some standards and motivations.

Virtue ethicist argues that moral behaviour expresses virtues or qualities of character. There is a much greater emphasis on "character traits" and "types of persons," than on rules, regulation, obligations, duties, and rights. Virtue ethics takes interest in questions such as these: Should we be selfish or generous? Hateful or benevolent? Cowardly or courageous? Over-indulgent or temperate? In what do these traits consist? How are they cultivated? And how do they figure in a life well lived? So basically the real answer of moral progress and training lies in the virtue ethics. it is a very fine idea to work upon the enhancement of the character and it's traits so we can become good, then all the ethical theory will work in a better way. Being good is a very big moral ideal which can be used as an antidote in the moral crisis; goodness is a holistic approach which requires several virtues and positive values. Virtue ethics and Positive and moral psychology involve the study of morality and goodnessbut these fields are more concerned with how a person comes to make a good or bad decision, right and wrong

choices rather than what sort of obligations he or she ought to follow. Character, reasoning, responsibility, and altruism, among other areas, also come into play, as does the development of morality. These practical approaches primarily focus on the question of how we can make an individual good and morally courageous so that in the face of dilemmas one does not leave the path of morality. Thus 'what should I do?' is an important question to address but we also ought not to forget about 'what one ought to be?', this approach will be holistic which will not only teach what is morality but also going to make us moral beings in ourselves.

Perhaps Martin Luther King's famous quotation "The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice." Is finely tuned that suggest that Moral progress is a reality; it can be understood in many ways and also can help us to explore our moral consciousness. Historical instances are the best way to understand it. the eradication of racism, sexism, slavery, homosexuality etc. are some of the best examples which need to be put forward so that people can understand the catastrophe of narrow mindedness and explore their consciousness by becoming more open-minded for the new approaches, perspectives and leave out the old fashioned conformity which has caged the humanity for centuries. We need to address the moral progress of the world. Some values of earlier periods were horrible. One reason we would never want to have been born in the past, rather than today, even if our past luxury would have been higher, is that we enjoy being the kind of people who doesn't burn widows, accepts slavery, participate in pogroms, or bash gays. At various times,anaesthesia, Homosexuality, contraception, vaccination, was considered intolerable. Would we prefer to get back to those days?

Thus storytelling, historical moral progress etc. can be the source of our moral training. We need to insist on our generation what would our future generation think about us, about our choices which are full of paradoxes and conflicts as we think about our ancestors and their choices. If our ancestor's choices could be horrible, can't our choices be wrong and intolerable? At least with the logic that we are also an imperfect human being like them, our reasoning could be fallacious and flawed, need to accept with humility .such kind of question and intellectual humility needs to address properly.

Utopia or dystopia, which method to choose in moral crisis?

Our moral life is often complex and reasonable people will disagree about what ought to be done in particular sets of circumstances. As one similarly minded theorist put it: … morality is internal. Now, this thing is very much important to address, what if our society is so much complex? What if descriptive and normative ethics don't work in moral progress? Then what can we do? Which method is more useful for the present time, utopian or dystopian? Now if we look everything from an optimistic perspective even in the darkest phases of moral crisis and keep hope about everything

that everything will be fine, then it is quite utopian, it neither taking the conception of 'prevention Is better than cure' into consideration nor advising something. Then what approach can help us regarding this? The dystopian approach seems quite effective and innovative for the modern world, which at least warns us about the dangers of not taking necessary steps towards any crisis. Actually, it is a very big crisis that our modern thinking scenario is that we care much more about our rights than about our 'good' and responsibility. We are much more hesitant to talk about our goodness: it seems moralistic or elitist. Similarly, we are nervous talking about duties and responsibility because of that a greater amount of our ethical energy or moral senesce goes to protecting claims and rights against each other which includes securing the state of our soul as purely private, purely our own business and whatever is left we put in metaethics. It can also be the reason we fall into the trap of moral relativism. Some of us just want an excuse for what we pursue.

The dystopian approach can be understood in a better way through Neil Postman, book Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business which he summarised two famous dystopian novels 1984 by George Orwell and Brave New World by Aldous Huxley in a single passage   "What Orwell feared were those who would ban books. What Huxley feared was that there would be no reason to ban a book, for there would be no one who wanted to read one…Orwell feared that the truth would be concealed from us. Huxley feared the truth would be drowned in a sea of irrelevance. Orwell feared we would become a captive culture. Huxley feared we would become a trivial culture…In 1984 people are controlled by inflicting pain. In Brave New World, they are controlled by inflicting pleasure. In short, Orwell feared that what we fear will ruin us. Huxley feared that what we desire will ruin us."[18] So the way (dystopian) Huxley and Orwell tried to argue how individual and social freedom dies so though we can try to tell the society and individual how we become immoral or adopt the wrong path which benefits some cunning social elements. So this dystopian approach can be very useful in the implementation and training of morality.

Another form of way to interpret the dystopian method through dystopian analogy.Just as in the face of any pandemic or epidemic we become highly cautious about everything whatever our doctors advise us, why don't we become equally cautious about the moral crisis? It is a defect of social complexity which is a threat to a healthy society. When society gets immune to the immoral things then I think we need to be alert and should take the necessary step towards that immoral disease. We need to pay attention to our moral physicians who care about society and humanity; the dangers and precautions they suggest or predict must be taken into consideration. Such kind of dystopian analogy can help us to prevent unhealthy social practices. So immorality and

any wrong practices is not an essence or permanent problem which can't be tackled, it can be resolved with the help of moral philosophy. The good thing about this discipline is that it doesn't need any equipment, modern technology etc. but can trace from any culture, civilization, and religion etc. a rational approach and moral courage to face the dilemmas and conflicts can help us to have a healthy society with good humans.

Moral practice as moral training: - Practice as a transmitter of positive values into behaviour

The cultivation of the moral values is uniquely a human enterprise, its practical ground is human life itself, and the practice of moral education is part of this area. Man doesn't seem to be instinctively or essentially courageous, and because moral acts take plenty of courage and 'strength of will' so training of those internal muscles is essential. It is a fact which everyone will have to accept that without mind makeup, the practice of will moral habits is hard to form as other habits. Plenty of thinkers claim that philosophy is an intellectualdiscourse, a source of conceptual clarification, but I think without having enough courage and a deliberate practice regarding anything we may not be capable to adopt any moral standards. It is a classical as well as a modern approach that practice is a very fine method to adopt something or best method of training. Science and art every discipline accept the idea that practice makes a man perfect and perfect practise more perfect.Numerous studies have been published which suggests the powerful impacts of practice, as mentioned in yoga sutra -

abhyāsa-vairāgya-ābhyāṁ tan-nirodhaḥ || ||

The state of yoga (includes moral restraints) is attained via a balance between practise (*abhyasa*) and imperturbability (*Vairagya*).[19]Similarly, Aristotle emphasized the vitality of practice to become virtuous. We need to accept this fact the virtue and human values can not be learned out of the book or picked up ready-made. They must be acquired, by practice, is in the case with the arts: they are not ours until they have become as habitual as to bepractically automatic. He signs and seal of the complete acquisition of any virtue is the tranquillity and harmony, we attain out of deliberate practice without any kind of external desire exceptperforming it only for the sake of performing it. Such harmony and tranquillity once gained become one's lasting and inalienable possession.

In Aristotle words: "we acquirevirtue by doing the acts, as in the case with arts too. Welearnart by doing that which we wish to do when we have learned it: we become builders by building, and so by doing just acts we become just, and by doing acts of temperance and courage we become temperate and courageous.it is by our conduct in our intercourse with other men that we become just or unjust, and by citing in

circumstances of danger, and training ourselves to feel fear or confidence, that we become courageous or cowardly.'[20]This doctrine that virtue, like skill in any game or craft, is gained by practice, deserve wordcourageous commitment. It seems to say "you must do the thing before you know-how to know how after you have done it" Despite all these facts,being humans and social part as well it is our duty and responsibility to always do goodand avoid wrong, and make this world a better place to live.it doesn't matter if Someone follows the moral paths by appealing to commandments associated with some divine being orbased onscience and natural rights, or fundamental facts about human nature, such as that suffering is intrinsically evil and bed so we should prevent it to the larger extent. So we can have so many ways and reason pursue the right andgood,but it is not true about wrong and evil acts.

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